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Recent Cases
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: JUDICIAL REVIEW:
WEIGHT GIVEN TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
BY A HEARING EXAMINER
Adduddell v. Bd. of Admin., Public Employees' Retirement System 1
The petitioner was the widow of a police officer of Oxnard, Cali-
fornia. After the death of her husband the petitioner filed an application
for surviving spouse benefits with the Public Employees' Retirement System,
but the application was denied. The System claimed that the divorce which
her first husband had obtained against her had not been valid, that con-
sequently she had never been legally married to the decedent, and that she
was therefore ineligible for survivor's benefits. On administrative appeal a
hearing was held before a hearing examiner of California's Office of Ad-
ministrative Procedure. The examiner found that the petitioner was the
putative wife of the decedent and as such was entitled to the benefits. The
Board of Administration accepted the examiner's finding that the petitioner
was the putative wife of the decedent, but rejected his legal conclusion as to
her right to benefits. Upon a further hearing the Board denied petitioner's
application.
Petitioner thereafter petitioned the superior court for a writ of
mandate2 directing the defendant Board to set aside its decision and pay
her the benefits. The trial court agreed with the findings of the Board
that the petitioner was ineligible for survivor's benefits even though she had
been the decedent's putative spouse. On appeal, the court of appeal held
that the trial court had erred in its conclusion of law and remanded the
case to the superior court with directions to issue a peremptory writ of
mandate requiring the defendant to pay benefits to the petitioner.3
Although the Adduddell opinion deals with the substantive issue of the
eligibility of the putative wife to receive survivor's benefits, the case indi-
cates the increasing power and authority of the hearing examiner. When
public agencies first found the need for separate individuals to conduct the
increasing number of hearings at which "circumstantial facts" were at is-
sue, the status of those to whom that duty was delegated was quite low.4
Since the agencies could not afford to pay attractive salaries, the competence
of the original hearing examiners was not altogether satisfactory.5 As a
result, when administrative decisions were reviewed, any conclusions of
the hearing examiner were greeted with skepticism. Today the importance of
1. 8 Cal.App.3rd 243, 87 Cal.Rptr. 268 (1970).
2. California's writ of mandate is equivalent to Missouri's writ of mandamus.
3. 8 Cal.App.3d at 250, 87 Cal.Rptr. at 272.
4. W. GELLHORN and C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-CAsEs AND COAMMN.M'T
1029 (4th ed. 1960).
5. Id. at 1029-32.
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competent hearing examiners is generally acknowledged, and the salaries,
while not yet commensurate with the degree of competence desired, are in
many cases sufficient to attract persons of reasonable ability.6 Yet some
of the skepticism which had been accorded to the reports of the earliest
hearing examiners has survived.7
At the federal level, the status of hearing examiners was elevated
somewhat in 1946 with the adoption of the Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.8 Hearing examiners had, by that time, become relatively num-
erous among federal agencies, at least as compared with their state counter-
parts0 The APA made specific reference to hearing examiners and granted
them new powers. First, the APA gave the hearing examiner the power
to make recommended or initial decisions.10 In applying this provision,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
the Federal Power Commission was powerless to make a final order until
such an intermediate report had been filed." Moreover, two United
States Supreme Court decisions made prior to the adoption of the APA
indicated that unless a statute or binding procedural rule otherwise re-
quires, an examiner's interim report or other statement of proposed findings
is necessary to satisfy due process requirements unless the issues in contro-
versy have been adequately defined elsewhere.' 2
Second, the APA provides that the examiner's decision is to be part of
the record on review' s and that the court must consult the "whole record"
on review.' 4 Professor Kenneth C. Davis has emphasized the importance of
this provision, because of the impact of the examiner's findings on the
reviewing court and the fact that if courts give weight to such reports, so
must the agencies. 15 Moreover, the APA provides that the examiner's initial
decision may become the final decision of the agency if (1) no party appeals;
or (2) if the agency does not of its own motion call up the case.' 6 Professor
Kenneth C. Davis, however, dismisses the importance of this provision and
insists that the power of the examiner is still in substance only one of mak-
ing recommendations.' 7
Other important effects of the APA on the status of the hearing ex-
aminer's decisions included the abolition of the absolute requirement of
each agency to reach its own conclusions on the evidence and the implicit
6. 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.05 (1958).
7. Id.
8. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344,
5362, 7521 (Supp. IV, 1969).
9. 2 K. DAvis, supra note 6, at § 10.01.
10. Administrative Procedure Act §9 5 (c), 7 (b), 8 (a), 5 U.S.C. §§ 554 (d),
556 (c), 557 (b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
11. Chotin Towing Corp. v. FPC, 250 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Accord:
Channel 16, Inc. v. FCC, 229 F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
12. E.g., specific charges in the complaint, or narrowed in briefs of counsel
or oral argument. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v. Mackay
Radio and Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
13. Administrative Procedure Act § 8 (b), 5 U.S.C. § 557 (b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
14. Id. at § 7 (c), 5 U.S.C. § 556 (d).
15. 2 K. DAVIs, supra note 6, at § 10.03.
16. Administrative Procedure Act § 8 (a), 5 U.S.C. § 557 (b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
17. 2 K. DAVIs, supra note 6, at § 10.06.
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requirement that the examiner's recommended decision be furnished to
the parties prior to any further decision or modification by the agency or
a review board.18 Despite these developments, it must be remembered
that the examiner's decisions are still limited by the provision that "the
agency shall . . .have all the powers which it would have in making the
initial decision,"'19 meaning that the agency can evaluate the evidence in the
record and make its own decision regardless of the recommendation of
the examiner.
While the APA gave weight to the examiner's findings, exactly how
much weight such findings were to be accorded developed into a major
problem, which has been dealt with in different ways by the various ap-
pellate circuits. 20 The situation was clarified somewhat by the Supreme
Court in Universal Camera Corporation v. NLRB.21 The NLRB had held a
hearing to determine whether an employee was wrongfully discharged. Al-
though the hearing examiner was not satisfied that the employer's motive
in firing was reprisal for testimony at another hearing, a majority of the
Board disagreed and ordered the employee's reinstatement. The Board
applied for an enforcement order, which was granted by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. Speaking for the majority, Judge Learned Hand stated,
although the Board would be wrong in totally disregarding his
[the hearing examiner's] findings, it is practically impossible for
a court, upon review of those findings which the Board itself sub-
stitutes, to consider the Board's reversal as a factor in the court's
own decision. This we say because we cannot find any middle
ground between doing that and treating such a reversal as error,
whenever it would be such, if done by a judge to a master in
equity.22
On appeal the United States Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, reversed.23
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dismissed Judge Hand's argument, stating that,
"reviewing courts should . . . give to the examiner's report such probative
force as it intrinsically commands."24 He further explained that "evidence
supporting a conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, ex-
perienced examiner who has observed the witnesses and lived with the
case has drawn conclusions different from the Board's than when he has
reached the same conclusion." 25 He also suggested that the significance
18. Id. at § 10.03.
19. Administrative Procedure Act § 8 (a), 5 U.S.C. § 557 (b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
20. Eastern Coal Corp. v. NLR.B, 176 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1949); NLRB v.
LaSalle Steel Co., 178 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1949); NLRB v. Minnesota Mining c Mfg.
Co., 179 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1950); NLRB v. Continental Oil Co., 179 F.2d 552
(10th Cir. 1950); NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950);
Pittsburg, S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 180 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950).
21. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
22. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 753 (2d Cir. 1950).
23. Justices Black and Douglas dissented, 340 U.S. 474, 497 (1951), adopting
the lower court opinion by Judge Hand in NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179
F.2d 749, 753 (2d Cir. 1950).
24. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRE, 340 U.S. 474, 495 (1951).
25. Id. at 496.
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of the examiner's findings should vary directly with the importance of
witness credibility.26
Universal Camera failed to settle the question. Confusion developed
as soon as the same case was decided on remand.27 Judge Hand ruled that
the Board could reject an examiner's findings based on his evaluation of
oral testimony only if the Board could do so through the rational use of
the Board's specialized knowledge28 or upon a finding that the examiner
has been unreasonably naive in believing a witness.29 Judge Frank asserted
in his concurring opinion that Hand's interpretation of the Supreme
Court's mandate was too restrictive.3 0 He opined that the Board was not
bound by an examiner's finding of facts about which no witness testified
but which the examiner inferred from other believed testimony.3' In 1954
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Allentown Broadcasting Corp.
v. FCC,32 relied on Hand's interpretation, holding that an examiner's find-
ing based on witness demeanor should not be overruled by a Board without
a "very substantial preponderance in the testimony as recorded." The
Supreme Court reversed.33 Mr. Justice Reed stated that the district court's
holding was equivalent to the application of a "dearly erroneous" test,
such as that contained in Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. He asserted that such a rule would give too much latitude to the
examiner at the expense of the Commission 34 especially where the facts
critical to the disposition of the case are policy or legislative facts as approved
by the circumstantial facts typically submitted for jury determination.
Since Allentown the courts have accepted the idea that an agency may
reverse the examiner even on questions based on witness credibility.3 5
At the same time, a reviewing court may adopt the examiner's findings
rather than those of the agency.3 6 Thus, according to the rule now followed
by federal courts, the agency has final factual determination, so long as
its findings are based on "substantial evidence in the light of the whole
record."37 The examiner's findings, when based primarily on witness credi-
bility, are a significant part of the record to which the reviewing court
looks to find "substantial evidence." Decisions of reviewing courts that
administrative findings are not supported by "substantial evidence" often
rest in part upon findings of examiners in conflict with the agencies' find-
ings. 8 The state courts, however, place considerably less importance upon
26. Id.
27. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951).
28. Id. at 430.
29. Id. at 431.
30. Id. at 432 (concurring opinion).
31. I.e., "Secondary" and "derivative inferences." Id. at 432. 2 K. DAvs,
supra note 6, suggests at § 10.04 that Judge Frank's statement "remains a reliable
guide."
32. 222 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
33. FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955).
34. Id. at 364.
35. See cases cited in 2 K. DAvis, supra note 6, at § 10.04, n. 29.
36. See In re United Corp., 249 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1957).
37. 4 K. DAvis, supra note 6, at § 30.05.
38. See Bituminous Material &i Supply Co. v. NLRB, 281 F.2d 365 (8th Cir.
1960) and other cases cited in 2 K. DAvis, supra note 6, at § 10.04 (Supp. 1965).
[Vol. 86
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hearing examiners' findings. The dominant view among state courts is
that the primary power to make findings of fact is in agency heads rather
than in hearing examiners.3 9 In California, the jurisdiction in which
Adduddell was decided, it has been stated that an agency, if dissatisfied
with the examiner's proposed opinion, may grant a new hearing and decide
the case anew on record and argument.4 0
The significance of a hearing examiner's findings depends in large
measure on the scope of review allowable to the reviewing court. A federal
court's scope of review is outlined in the APA.41 It provides that the review-
ing court has the power to review all questions of law, interpret statutory
and constitutional provisions, and determine whether factual findings are
arbitrary, unconstitutional, outside the agency's jurisdiction, procedurally
infirm or unsupported by "substantial evidence." 42
The scope of review of Missouri courts is outlined by the state con-
stitution, 43 statutes, 44 and a rule of the supreme court.45 The scope of ju-
39. Edmonds v. Skelly Oil Co., 204 Okla. 471, 231 P.2d 360 (1951); Fort Pond
Inn Co. vs. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 324 Mass. 281, 86 N.E.2d
56 (1949); Schmoll v. J. W. Craig Co., 228 Minn. 429, 37 N.W.2d 539 (1949); Kenny
v. Esslinger's Brewery, 161 Pa.Super. 451, 55 A.2d 554 (1947); 2 K. DAs, supra
note 6, at § 10.03.
40. Hohreiter v. Garrison, 81 Cal.App.2d 384, 394, 184 P.2d 323, 331 (1947).
41. Administrative Procedure Act § 10 (e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. IV, 1969).
42. Id. states:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(l ) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably de-
layed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and cor-
clusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in acordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or im-
munity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,
or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
section 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of
an agency hearing provided by statute; or(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be
taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
43. Mo. CONSr. art. V, § 22, which states:
All final decisions, findings, rules and orders of any administrative officer
or body existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial
or quasi-judicial and affect private rights, shall be subject to direct review
by the courts as provided by law; and such review shall include the deter-
mination whether the same are authorized by law, and in cases in which
a hearing is required by law, whether the same are supported by competent
and substantial evidence upon the whole record.
44. §§ 536.100, .130, .140, RSMo 1969.
45. Mo. R. Civ. P. 100.03, .06, .07. Rule 100 consists of the practice and
1971]
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dicial review of administrative decisions in Missouri depends, to some ex-
tent, on whether the proceeding is a "contested case"4 6 involving "private
rights".4 7 Review of administrative rule making, where no "contested case"
is involved, is reviewable through a declaratory judgment.4 8 Missouri law
confines review of factual determinations in a manner similar to that of the
APA. 41 Missouri lawmakers departed from the APA approach in providing
specifically for judicial review of so-called "mixed questions" of law and
fact,50 and in allowing alternatives as to what constitutes the record.51
The statute exempts from its provisions those agencies which have their
own statutory review proceedings, and is not applicable to agencies not
required by statute to hold hearings. 2 The Administrative Hearing Com-
mission's final decisions are subject to these provisions.53 As one noted
scholar has pointed out, statutory language is not necessarily the determinant
criteria in the decision as to the proper scope of review. Because statutory
and constitutional provisions are so broad and general, their directives
are rarely "so narrow as to prevent a court from making the review as broad
or as narrow as the court deems proper under the particular circum-
stances."8 4
procedure provisions of Chapter 536, RSMo 1969 relating to circuit court and
appellate court administrative review. The portions of Chapter 536 which are
not included in the rule are the provisions dealing with practice and procedure
before the agencies themselves, and section 536.050, dealing with jurisdiction and
venue.
46. § 536.100, RSMo 1969; Mo. R. Civ. P. 100.03. "Contested case" is defined
as "a proceeding before an agency in which legal rights, duties, or privileges of
specific parties are required by statute to be determined after hearing." § 536.010 (3),
RSMo 1969.
47. Mo. CoNsT. art. V, § 22.
48. § 536.050, RSMo 1969, provides:
The power of the courts of this state to render declaratory judgments shall
extend to declaratory judgments respecting the validity of rules, or
of threatened applications thereof, and such suits may be maintained
against agencies whether or not the plaintiff has first requested the agency
to pass upon the question presented....
49. § 536.140 (2), RSMo 1969; Mo. R. Civ. P. 100.07 (b) reads as follows:
Scope of Judicial Review-judgment-appeals.-The inquiry may extend to
a determination of whether the action of the agency
(1) Is in violation of constitutional provisions;
(2) Is in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency;
(3) Is unsupported by competent and substantial evidence upon the
whole record;
(4) Is, for any other reason, unauthorized by law;
) Is made upon unlawful procedure or without a fair trial;
(6) Is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.(7) Involves an abuse of discretion....
Note, however, that the statute does not allow judicial determination
of whether the agency's action was "clearly erroneous." This may be
interpreted as a legislative bar to substitution of judgment by the reviewing
court.
50. 536.140 (3), RSMo 1969; Mo. R. Civ. P. 100.07 (c).
51. 536.130, RSMo 1969; Mo. R. Cv. P. 100.06.
52. Judicial Review and Control of Missouri Administrative Agencies, 19
K.C.L. REv. 268 (1951).
53. Administrative Hearing Commission Rule 9.00.
54. 2 F. COOPER, STATE A~nms ,usrrvE LAw 664 (1965).
[Vol. 36
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Considerable importance is attached to the classification of a particular
finding as "law" or "fact." There is a large middle ground of so-called
"mixed questions" of law and fact, consisting of "inferences of ultimate
fact."5 5 Application of statutory requirements to particular fact situations,
such as occurred in Adduddell, and indeed in most reported administrative
law cases typify this broad category. Such questions as "Is A the owner?,"
"Is W the wife of H?," "Is the book 'obscene'?," "Is the foreman an em-
ployee?" are common examples of "mixed questions." 56 if a court designates
an administrative finding as "fact," the court will not review it; whereas,
if the court designates such a finding as one of "law," it can substitute its
own judgment for that of the agency.57 Thus, a reviewing court's characteri-
zation of the question as "law" or "fact" in determining its scope of review
has broad implications as to the weight of an examiner's findings. Although
an examiner purportedly has no authority to determine with finality a ques-
tion of law, his conclusions of law involved in resolving "mixed questions"
can have great weight to the extent that a reviewing court classifies such
"mixed questions" as "questions of fact."
The legal conclusions of hearing examiners in federal agencies have
been accorded great influence because federal courts have tended to classify
the application of legal concepts to facts as "fact," thereby refusing to review
them.58 The basic approach of the federal courts, as laid out by the United
States Supreme Court, is that they should affirm an administrative decision
involving the application of statutory terms to undisputed or established
facts if the decision has a rational basis.5 9 This approach was clarified in
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.60 in which the court was asked to review
an NLRB decision regarding whether newsboys were "employees" within
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. Mr. Justice Rutledge,
speaking for seven members of the Court, stated, "it is not the Court's
function to substitute its own inferences of fact for the Board's, when the
latter have support in the record." 61 He went on to declare that "where the
question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term," the Board's
decision should "be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reason-
able basis in law." 62 Judge Irving R. Kaufman recently explained this ap-
proach employed by the federal courts.63 After pointing out that Congress
has specified that common law rules apply to NLRB determinations as to
whether one is an employee or an independent contractor,64 he states:
The Supreme Court has recognized that such a determination of
pure agency law involves no special administrative expertise that a
55. Id. at 708.
56. 4 K. DAvis, supra note 6, at § 30.01. For discussions of what motivates a
court's treatment of "mixed questions" as either "law" or "fact," see §§ 30.01-14;
2 F. CooPEa, supra note 54, at 663 ff.
57. 4 K. DAvs, supra note 6, at §§ 30.05, .14.
58. See cases cited in 4 K. DAvis, supra note 6, at §§ 30.01, .03.
59. The leading case for this proposition is Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
60. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
61. Id. at 130.
62. Id. at 131.
63. Kaufman, Judicial Review of Agency Action: A Judge's Unburdening,
45 N.Y.U.L. Ruv. 201 (1970).
64. Id. at 203.
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court does not possess. The Court has instructed us, however, that
the N.L.R.B.'s decision that particular persons are employees and
not independent contractors must not be set aside simply because
an appellate court, as an original matter, would decide the case
differently. 65
However, even federal courts occasionally abandon judicial restraint
where the decision seems "just plain wrong." In Boyd v. Folson66 the court
of appeals reviewed a claim for benefits which depended on whether the
claimant was "living with" her husband at the time of his death. The court
classified this "mixed question" as one of law and substituted its own judg-
ment. Chief Judge Biggs, speaking for the majority in a 2-1 decision,
observed:
[T~his finding by the referee was in the nature of an ultimate
finding of fact, and is nothing more than a legal inference from
other facts.... [S]ince ultimate facts must be reached by a process
of legal reasoning based on the legal significance to be afforded
primary evidentiary facts this aspect of administrative fact-finding
has its law-making aspect, and is therefore reviewable. 67
State courts, for the most part, have been less willing to adopt the
federal court's philosophy of judicial restraint, and have been more willing
to review the reasonableness of the agencies' inferences of ultimate facts
derived from more basic factual findings. 68 Typical of the state approach is
a Pennsylvania decision in which the court overturned an agency determina-
tion which had been sustained by the court below as supported by "sub-
stantial evidence." 69 This active tendency of state courts to review adminis-
trative determinations of "mixed questions" reduces the weight given to a
hearing examiner's conclusions of law.7 0
Guidelines for a similarly sweeping judicial review of administrative
decisions involving "mixed questions" are set forth by a Missouri statute:
Whenever the action of the agency being reviewed does not involve
the exercise by the agency of administrative discretion in the light
of the facts, but involves only the application by the agency of the
law to the facts, the court may weigh the evidence for itself and
determine the facts accordingly. The law applied by the agency as
aforesaid may include the agency's own rules. In making such
determination the court shall give due weight to the opportunity
of the agency to observe the witnesses, and to the expertness and
experience of the particular agency.7'
65. Id. The decision to which Judge Kaufman referred was NLRB v. United
Insurance Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
66. 257 F.2d 778 (Sd Cir. 1958).
67. Id. at 781.
68. 2 F. COOPER, supra note 54, at 707, 709.
69. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Medical Educ. and Licensure v. Schireson, 360
Pa. 129, 61 A.2d 348 (1948).
70. Professor Cooper's studies have shown that state courts tend to treat as
questions of law such matters as application of statutory conditions for unemploy-
ment compensation or workmen's compensation benefits. See 2 F. COOPER, supra
note 54, at 716-21 and cases cited therein.
71. § 536.140 (3), RSMo 1969; Mo. R. Crv. P. 100.07 (c) is identical.
[Vol. 86
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Some decisions of Missouri courts reviewing agency findings have adopted
the spirit of these guidelines.7 2 In many of these decisions, the court simply
reviewed the agency's decisions on these "mixed questions" without any
ruling or comment regarding the court's power to review them 7 3 This
approach illustrates Professor Davis's observation that whenever a court
substitutes its own judgment for that of the agency, it merely decides, with-
out stating its reasons for not applying a "rational basis" test7 4 On the
other hand, it appears that a majority of Missouri cases construe the statu-
tory provisions very narrowly, producing a 'hands off" policy closer to the
approach of federal courts than that of most state courts. Soon after the
adoption of Missouri's statutory appeal procedure, the Missouri Supreme
Court, in an en banc decision, ruled that "the reviewing court may not
substitute its own judgment on the evidence for that of the administrative
tribunal." 75 Another en banc decision shortly thereafter construed the
court's function under the statutory scheme to be "to decide whether such
tribunal could have reasonably made its findings, and reached its result,
upon consideration of all evidence before it.' 76 A 1952 decision stated that
the court should view the record "in a light most favorable to the findings of
the Commission." 77 Iron County v. State Tax Commission78 is a recent
application of this "hands off" approach. The "mixed question" involved
was the valuation of property for assessment purposes. The only basis for
the Commission's finding was expert testimony which was inadmissible but
not properly objected to. The supreme court found "that this evidence
72. Recent decisions in point include West Lake Quarry and Material Co. v.
Schaffner, 451 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1970), where the supreme court reversed a decision
by the director of revenue involving a determination whether certain machinery
was subject to state sales tax. In Defenders' Townhouse, Inc. v. Kansas City, 441
S.W.2d 365 (Mo. 1969) the court determined whether the property in question was
exclusively used for purely charitable purposes and therefore exempt from taxation,
and agreed with a city board of delinquent tax adjustment that it was not. The St.
Louis Court of Appeals followed the same procedure in Burger King, Inc. v. Weisz,
444 S.W.2d 517 (SLL. Mo. App. 1969), determining whether appellant's hamburger
stand was a "drive-in" within the meaning of a zoning ordinance. An extreme ex-
ample of active substitution of a Missouri court's judgment for that of an agency is
State ex rel. Keystone Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426 S.W. 11
(Mo. 1968), noted in Friedhoff, Mandamus and Discretionary Acts-A Novel Ap-
proach, 34 Mo. L. Rav. 408 (1969), where the supreme court applied the extraordi-
nary writ of mandamus to upset the determination of the Industrial Commission
that a laundry was an "industrial plant" within the meaning of a Missouri statute.
It has been suggested that this case stands for the proposition that mandamus may
be used as a means of overturning agency decisions clearly within the agency's
discretion, but this case rests on doubtful authority. Friedhoff, Mandamus and
Discretionary Acts-A Novel Approach, 34 Mo. L. Rav. 408-10 (1969).
(1969).
73. See West Lake Quarry and Material Co. v. Schaffner, 451 S.W.2d 140 (Mo.
1970); Defenders' Townhouse, Inc. v. Kansas City, 441 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. 1969);
Burger King, Inc. v. Weisz, 444 S.W.2d 517 (St.L. Mo. Am. 1969).
74. 4 K. DAvis, supra note 6, at § 30.07.
75. Wood v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 355 Mo. 670, 672, 197 S.W.2d 647, 649 (En
Banc 1946).
76. Seabaugh's Dependents v. Garver Lumber Mfg. Co., 355 Mo. 1153, 1166,
200 S.W.2d 55, 62 (En Banc 1947).
77. Thacker v. Massman Const. Co., 247 S.W.2d 623, 627 (Mo. 1952).
78. 437 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
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constitutes sufficient and substantial evidence to support the decision of
the commission,"7 9 even though the evidence in this case was required to
overcome a presumption of validity of an assessor's valuation approved by
the county board of equalization.8 0
Thus, given the "hands off" tendency of Missouri courts, as compared
with the predominant "judicial activism" of most state courts, a Missouri
hearing examiner's findings on "mixed questions" have almost as much
chance of survival as do federal decisions. However, since Missouri courts
have some history of substituting judgment, there is no real assurance as to
whether or not a Missouri court will review an administrative determination
of a "mixed question."
The question remains [conceding the court's relatively unchecked
power to review a given question], what are the formal rules governing the
weight to be given to the conclusion of a hearing examiner? The courts
have said very little about this problem in their decisions. That a federal
court, when it deviates from its normal policy of restraint, will look at the
examiner's reasoning is apparent in Boyd v. Folsom.81 The court noted that
the referee's conclusion "was either induced by an erroneous view as to the
legal standard to be applied to such contributions or if the correct standard
were applied is not supportable by the record."82 Some legal writers ap-
parently believe that the role of a federal hearing examiner remains essen-
tially that of recommending.83 On the other hand, it has also been argued
that the future potential of the influence of examiners' findings is quite
high; that the inevitable acceptance of the examiner as a "man of eminence"
will affect judgments about what he should do and how he should do it.84
In the state arena even less has been written on the problem, and the
weight given to examiners' legal conclusions remains a matter of specula-
tion. Even Adduddell is mute on the subject. But the Adduddell decision is
an example of a state court looking back to the hearing examiner's decision
and adopting it over the agency's decision.85 The California court did so
even though the agency is generally regarded as having the final adminis-
trative word, and is spite of a prior decision allowing an agency to reject the
examiner's findings altogether.86
Adduddell has a close parallel in a recent Missouri decision. In Or-
phant v. St. Louis State Hospital, Division of Mental Diseases8 7 an injured
volunteer worker's claim for workmen's compensation benefits depended on
whether she was an employee within the meaning of the statute. At the
hearing, the referee ruled that the plaintiff was an employee and awarded
her $2598.75. The award was reversed by the Industrial Commission on the
79. Id. at 673.
80. See also Tom Boy, Inc. v. Quinn, 431 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Mo. En Banc
1968); McGrath v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 411 S.W.2d 260, 262 (St.L. Mo.
App. 1967.
81. 2 7 F.2d 778 (3d. Cir. 1958).
82. Id. at 782.
83. 2 K. DAvis, supra note 6, at § 10.04.
84. W. GELL oRN and C. BysE, supra note 4, at 1030.
85. 8 Cal. App. 3d 243, 87 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1970).
86. Hohreiter v. Garrison, 81 Cal. App. 2d 384, 184 P.2d 323 (1947).
87. 441 S.W.2d 355 (Mo. 1969).
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ground that the evidence failed to show the plaintiff to be an employee. On
appeal, the circuit court reversed and reinstated the finding of the referee.
The supreme court affirmed the circuit court's decision. In Orphant, as sub-
sequently in Adduddel, the reviewing court overturned the legal conclu-
sions of the agency in favor of those of the hearing examiner. Adduddell,
however, goes somewhat beyond Orphant. In the latter decision, the original
reviewing court determined that the referee's conclusion was correct and
the agency's erroneous, with the Missouri Supreme Court merely affirming
the circuit court;88 the California court of appeals rejected not only the
findings of the agency, but also those of the lower court in reinstating the
decision of the hearing examiner.8 9
It is possible that these two decisions mark a new trend among state
courts to give greater weight to a hearing examiner's conclusions of law. If
Orphant can be viewed as standing for the proposition that a reviewing
court in Missouri may accept the legal conclusions of a hearing examiner
over those of the agency, perhaps California's action in Adduddell will
herald a similar extension in Missouri. With the rapidly increasing case load
resulting from administrative appeals, giving more authority to experienced,
competent hearing examiners would certainly be a welcome development.
On the other hand, it is equally arguable that the courts in these decisions
were merely exercising their own independent judgment on the legal issues,
and that their agreement with the conclusions of the hearing examiner was
merely coincidental. The courts' failure to discuss any ramifications con-
cerning increased power or influence of hearing examiners provides tacit
support for this view. In either case, the courts would do well to discuss this
issue and provide guidelines for future reference. Until such an opinion is
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ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE-THE INCREASING BURDEN OF
LAND OWNERSHIP
Salanski v. Enright'
Plaintiff, a 10 year old boy, filed suit seeking $100,000 in damages
alleging that defendants failed to exercise proper care in keeping their
premises safe. It was further alleged that defendants allowed and maintained
dangerous treehouses on their property which were built high above the
ground, well knowing that children regularly played on them. Finally, it
was asserted that defendants failed to warn plaintiff that it was dangerous
to climb in the trees and play upon the tree houses, and that they induced,
encouraged, allured and invited plaintiff to their premises to play in the
tree houses well knowing that a child could easily fall and be injured. The
trial court dismissed plaintiff's suit on the grounds that he had failed to
state a cause of action, whereupon plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court
of Missouri. In reversing and remanding the cause for trial the court held
that while the petition may be subject to being made more definite, its alle-
gations hypothesize facts that would allow a recovery under section 339 of
the Restatement (First) of Torts, which the court thus adopted as the law
of Missouri.
This decision revives interest in the attractive nuisance doctrine as a
basis for overcoming the defenses of a landowner against an infant entrant
in an action to recover for personal injury or death. Salanski is the first Mis-
souri case since 1939 wherein a plaintiff has been given a chance for recovery
under the attractive nuisance doctrine. A change in the law was forecast in
19672 but until now it was impossible to predict what form the change
would take.3
Traditionally, the Missouri courts have required plaintiffs to satisfy
two requirements before allowing recovery under the attractive nuisance
doctrine. First, there must be "allurement" resulting from the attractiveness
of the injury-producing instrumentality or condition.4 Second, the injury-
producing instrumentality or condition must have been "inherently danger-
ous" rather than a condition made dangerous by the collateral or casual
negligence of the defendant under the particular circumstances.5
The most widely cited Missouri case restating these requirements is
1. 452 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1970).
2. Thieret v. Hoel, 412 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Mo. 1967). The court said: "[1]t
may well be that this jursidiction should reexamine its prior decisions in this entire
field of the law and reconsider the suggestions and criticisms of the experts."
3. The attractive nuisance doctrine, from its first recognition in Koons v.
St. Louis & Iron Mt. R.R., 65 Mo. 592 (1877) until the last time it was approved as
a basis for recovery in Hull v. Gillio, 344 Mo. 1227, 130 S.W.2d 623 (1939), is the
subject of excellent comment in a prior edition of the MissouR LAw Ruvmw.
Prewitt, The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine in Missouri, 29 Mo. L. REv. 24 (1964).
The Missouri Supreme Court in Arbogast v. Terminal R.R. Assn of St. L., 452
S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1970) said at 84: "Now that § 342 of Restatement of the Law,
Torts, has been adopted in this state it would seem that § 339, 2 Restatement of the
Law, Torts, First (1934) should also apply. .. "
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Hull v. Gillioz,6 in which the court allowed recovery to an eight year old
plaintiff who lost a leg when it was crushed by a steel I-beam. There plain-
tiff presented evidence that defendant stacked I-beams on an unfenced,
unguarded lot and that defendant had knowledge that children habitually
played with these beams, banging them together to produce a loud "twang".
Although the court affirmed a recovery for the plaintiff, it went out of its
way to specifically reject section 339 of the Restatement (First) of Torts as
a basis for recovery. The court emphasized that the Restatement conflicted
with settled Missouri law in two respects, namely, the two traditional Mis-
souri requirements mentioned above-"allurement" and "inherently danger-
ous conditions." 7
On a motion for rehearing the court in Hull more fully explained its
position regarding the meaning of the "inherently dangerous" requirement.
The court said that an object might be inherently dangerous either because
of danger inhering in the instrumentality itself or inhering in the condi-
tion in which it was permitted to exist.8 This explanation indicated that
either the object itself or its circumstantial position might be "inherently
dangerous" and that if either or both tests were satisfied this requirement
("inherently dangerous") would be met. Despite this lucid description of
"inherently dangerous" set forth in Hull, two years later in Emery v.
Thompson9 the court denied recovery to a plaintiff whose minor son had
been killed by a falling railroad tie. Plaintiff had offered evidence that
children habitually played on the stack of railroad ties and that defendant
had knowledge of the children's presence. Even though the case was
factually indistinguishable from Hull, the court held that railroad ties were
not "inherently dangerous" because the danger, if any, was in the negligent
manner in which they were piled. 9 For this reason, the court said, the
danger existed only because of mere casual or collateral negligence of others
in piling the ties."1 Thus, whatever encouragement an attractive nuisance
6. Id.
7. By expressly adopting section 339 Salanski rejects the traditional view
espoused by Hull. Salanski must, therefore, be considered as having overruled Hull.
8. Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 1237-38, 130 S.W.2d 623, 629 (1939).
9. 347 Mo. 494, 148 S.W.2d 479 (1941).
10. Id. The court indicated it was foreclosed from deciding if railroad ties are
"inherently dangerous" by Kelly v. Benas, 217 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 557 (1909). The
court said that Kelly stands for the proposition that lumber, however piled, does
not come under the attractive nuisance doctrine. Kelly involved a nine year old boy
who was killed while playing on a pile of lumber at defendant's box factory. Id. at
498, 148 S.W.2d at 480. The boards were 16 feet long, 2 inches thick, and 2 feet
wide. It is hard to understand how the court could place railroad ties under the
blanket classification of lumber and exempt them from the attractive nuisance
doctrine. Size 2" x 24" boards are hardly synonymous with railroad ties.
11. The term casual or collateral negligence first appears in Hull at 628. The
cases cited in Hull as authority for the proposition that casual or collateral negli-
gence is some sort of exception to the inherently dangerous requirement deal main-
ly with the respective liability of a principal and independent contractors; if the
dangerous condition is created by an independent contractor he is liable, not the
principal. This would be a defense to be set up by the defendant and in Emory
there is no mention that an independent contractor is involved. It seems rather




et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
plaintiff might have received from the holding in Hull was seriously re-
duced by the Emery decision, which seemed to impose a third requirement,
namely "non-collateral negligence."
The attractive nuisance doctrine was brought before the court again
in 1941 by parents of a nine year old boy who, while playing in defendant's
rock quarry,'2 was killed when struck by the handle of a coopers bucket.13
Plaintiffs presented evidence that defendant knew that children frequently
played around the buckets and that if these bucket handles were left in an
upright position without the fastening ring in place they could be very
dangerous.14 The court, in denying recovery, said that leaving the buckets
standing without the ring attached was no more than mere casual negli-
gence' 5 and there was not evidence sufficient to establish that defendant
maintained an attractive nuisance.' 6 The court seemed to add a fourth re-
quirement to those already established ("allurement, .... inherently danger-
ous," and "non-collateral negligence") when it declared that there can be no
nuisance, attractive or otherwise, except from a condition maintained over
an "unreasonable period of time."' 7 The Missouri Supreme Court quashed
the opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals' s on the theory that the
opinion contradicted the law of the attractive nuisance doctrine laid down
in Hull even though Hull never mentioned the "unreasonable period of
time" requirement. Thus, by 1941 if an infant plaintiff was to recover
under the Missouri attractive nuisance doctrine he was required to show:
(1) that he had ben lured onto the land by the dangerous condition or in-
strumentality;19 (2) that the instrumentality or condition was inherently
dangerous; 20 (3) that the condition was not created by the negligence of
some other person; 2 ' and (4) that the defendant had allowed the condition
to exist for an unreasonable period of time.2 2
Between 1941 and 1970, with one possible exception, 23 every plaintiff
who invoked the attractive nuisance doctrine in order to overcome the de-
fendant's "no duty" defense was denied recovery. Thus, plaintiffs were
12. State ex rel. W. E. Callahan Const. Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 1209, 159
S.W.2d 251 (1941).
13. A coopers bucket is a large steel bucket used in rock quarries to lift gravel
or crushed rock.
14. 348 Mo. 1209, 1215, 159 S.W.2d 251, 254.
15. See note 11 supra.
16. State ex rel. W. E. Callahan Const. Co. v. Hughes, 848 Mo. 1209, 159
S.W.2d 251 (1941).
17. Id. at 1215, 159 S.W.2d at 254.
18. Street v. W. E. Callahan Const. Co., 147 S.W.2d 153 (St.L. Mo. App. 1941).
19. Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 1237-38, 130 S.W.2d 623, 627 (1939).
20. Id.
21. State ex rel. W. E. Callahan Const. Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 1209, 1215, 159
S.W.2d 251, 254 (1941).
22. Emery v. Thompson, 847 Mo. 494, 498, 148 S.W.2d 479, 480 (1941).
23. Cooper v. Finke, 376 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1964). This case involved a 14 year
old boy who was injured while rocking back and forth on a graveyard marker when
it fell and he was injured. Defendant was granted a summary judgment at the trial.
The court did not decide if plaintiff made a case under the attractive nuisance
doctrine but hinted that he did not. The court said that the record did not establish
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff or the freedom from negligence of the
defendant so the cause should be remanded for trial.
[Vol. so
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denied recovery where defendant left a trash fire burning and a three
year old child was injured;2 4 where a five year old boy drowned in a water
filled excavation in front of a shiny aluminum tank;25 where a five year
old boy fell from a bridge of overlapping boards over an excavation;2 6
where a five year old boy was cut on a jagged piece of marble on defendant's
property;2 7 where a four year old drowned in a pond on defendant's prop-
erty;28 where a fourteen year old boy was impaled on a reinforcing rod
when the dirt around the edge of an excavation caved in.29 By 1967 it was
clear that the attractive nuisance doctrine was not much help to the attorney
representing an infant land entrant in Missouri.
Thus in 1968, the parents of a five year old who drowned in an old
well on defendant's property eschewed "attractive nuisance" and sought
to establish liability on the theory that the boy was a "licensee" killed by a
trap of which the landowner had actual knowledge.8 0 Since children fre-
quently played on defendant's property with defendant's knowledge and
without objection, the plaintiffs argued that their son was a "licensee." The
court upheld a $10,000 verdict for the parents because a landowner in Mis-
souri was liable to a "licensee" for damages resulting from injuries due to
an ultrahazardous condition or hidden peril of which the owner had knowl-
edge but of which the "licensee" was ignorant.31 The court equated ultra-
hazardous condition or hidden peril with the term "inherently dangerous"
as used in the attractive nuisance cases.3 2 Following Bichsel v. BlumhostA8
if the child could be classified as a "licensee" the attractive nuisance doc-
trine offered no additional advantage to the plaintiff and had the marked
disadvantages of the "allurement" and "unreasonable period of time" re-
quirements. Because of the state of the law at that time, however, plain-
tiff was still faced with what amounted to an "inherently dangerous" re-
quirement, (hidden danger, trap, snare, pitfall and the like).
In 1969, however, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted section 342 of
the Restatement (First) of Torts,34 which, in effect, removed the "inherently
dangerous" requirement as a component of the infant licensee's prima
facie case. Under section 342 the landowner is required to warn of or cure
those defects, both natural and artificial, located on his land of which he
has knowledge and which he realizes the "licensee" will not discover or
realize the risk.3 5 This requirement made a child's case considerably less
difficult if the child could be classified as a "licensee."
24. Lentz v. Schuerman Bldg. 8 Realty Co., 359 Mo. 103, 220 S.W.2d 58 (1949);
Weathers, Torts-Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, 15 Mo. L. REv. 97 (1950).
25. Holifield v. Wigdor, 361 Mo. 636, 235 S.W.2d 564 (1951).
26. Patterson v. Gibson, 287 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. 1956).
27. Cox v. Gros, 360 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1962).
28. Baker v. Prayer & Sons, Inc., 361 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1962).
29. Thieret v. Hoel, 412 S.W.2d 127 (1967).
30. Bichsel v. Blumhost, 429 S.W.2d 301 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968).
31. Id. at 306.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 301.
34. Wells v. Goforth, 443 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. En Banc 1969), noted in Penning-
ton, Missouri Abrogates The "No Duty" Rule As To Social Guest: Restatement(First) Adopted 35 Mo. L. REv. 252 (1970).
35. 2 RESTATE ENT (FirsT) oF ToRTs § 342 (1934).
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Following the court's adoption of section 342 in Wells, the attorney
representing the infant land entrant had an escape from the shackles of
Missouri attractive nuisance law, which was fashioned by classifying the
child as a "licensee." After Salanski the attorney representing the child
trespasser or bare "licensee" should realize that the attractive nuisance doc-
trine may offer the better chance of recovery. Today, however, "attractive
nuisance" is no longer as restrictive as formerly. The Restatement (First) of
Torts section 339 states:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to
young children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other
artificial condition which he maintains upon the land, if
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon
which the possessor knows or should know that such children
are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should
know and which he realizes or should realize as involving an
unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such chil-
dren, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the
condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or
in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition
is slight as compared to the risk to young children involved
therein.3 6
The most obvious change presented by section 339 is the abandon-
ment of the allurement requirement.3s The inherently dangerous require-
ment has been replaced by an "unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily
injury" requirement.3 8 The land owner is responsible for conditions of
which he knows or should know.3 9 It should be noted that this is a stricter
requirement than the actual knowledge required by section 342 of the
Restatement (First) of Torts regarding the landowner's duty to the "licen-
see". 40 However, it should also be noted that section 339 only applies to
artificial conditions41 and not to natural conditions which are covered by
section 342 of the Restatement (First).42
It is significant, moreover, that the court did not adopt section 339
Restatement (Second) of Torts but implicitly adopted the Restatement
(First).43 The Restatement (Second) actually affords the landowner more
86. Id. at 839. The court in Salinski sets out § 889 in footnote 1, 452 S.W.2d at
144.
87. 2 RrSTATE mT (FiRsT) oF ToaRs § 389 (1934), comment on clause (a). See
W. PRossER, LAw oF ToRTs 875 (3d ed. 1964).
88. 2 RESrATEMErT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 889 (1934), comment on clause (b).
This change is the most beneficial to the plaintiff. Now the danger does not have
to lie in the character of the condition but rather in the careless or inattentive
nature of the child trespasser. The emphasis is shifted from the nature of the con-
dition to the nature of the child.
89. 2 RESTATEMENT (FiRsT) oF ToRTs § 889 (1984).
40. Id. at § 842.
41. Id. at § 839.
42. Id. at § 842.
43. Arbogast v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St.L., 452 S.W.2d 81, 84-85 (Mo. 1970).
This case involved a 12 year old girl who fell from a railroad trestle. The court
(Vol. 86
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protection than the Missouri-adopted Restatement (First) in that under the
Restatement (Second) the landowner is liable for conditions of which he
knows of or has reason to know.44 This requirement imposes no duty upon
the landowner4 5 to acquire knowledge whereas the "should know" re-
quirement of the Restatement (First) (which is now the law in Missouri)
does impose such a duty upon the landowner. 46
In adopting section 339 of the Restatement (First) the court recognized
that although section 339 would not normally apply to conditions of height,
certain exceptions (including something which may be called the "distract-
ing influence exception") must be made.47 The idea that a "distracting in-
fluence exception" is to be made part of the Missouri law is further shown
by the court's approval of Cargill, Inc. v. Zimmer.48 The idea of a distract-
ing influence lessening the normally strict contributory fault test put on the
plaintiff land entrant has been recognized before in Missouri regarding an
"adult invitee." 49
Now that Missouri has adopted the Restatement (First) positions con-
cerning the invitee, licensee and child trespasser, the following chart may
be helpful in relating these positions to the knowledge required of the land-
owner and the type of condition for which he will be held responsible.
actual knowledge should know of must know of
§ 842 licensee (Wells § 43-invitee (Hat- § 343-invitee (possi.Natural v. Goforth) bourn v. Katz Drug bly)
Conditions § 343-invitee (Har- Co.)
bourn v. Katz Drug
Co.)
§ 339--child trespasser § 339-child trespasser § 343-invitee (possi-
(Salanski v. Enright) (Salanski v. Enright) bly)
Artificial § 342-licensee (Wells § 342-invitee .(Bar-
Conditions v. Goforth) bourn v. Katz Drug
§ 343-invitee (Har- Co.)
bourn v. Katz Drug
Co.)
decided the case under § 339 but denied the plaintiff recovery because there was
no evidence that the obvious danger of falling from the trestle was hidden from the
child in any way.
44. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965).
45. Id. at § 12.
46. Id.
47. Salanski v. Enright, 452 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Mo. 1970).
48. 374 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1967). This case dealt with a 12 year old boy who
was killed when he fell from a 72 foot silo located on defendant's property. The
court recognized that while the allurement requirement is not necessary under 339,
it is of evidential importance in determining whether the child fully appreciated
the danger. The court upheld a recovery under § 339 of the RFATEMENT (SECOND)
where the danger was obvious (height) because the pigeons had roosted in the top
of the silo and diverted the child's attention from climbing. 32 ATL. L. J. 369, 778
(1968).
49. Harbourn v. Katz Drug Co., 318 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. 1958).
1971]
17
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
While Salanski represents a sharp break from the prior direction of
the Missouri attractive nuisance doctrine, the court now must decide how
it will interpret the requirements of the section 339. Missouri's prior case
law would suggest a narrow interpretation, but the court's approval of
Cargill hints at a more liberal interpretation. Missouri now belongs to the
growing majority of jurisdictions which hold that a child's right to safety
outweighs the landowner's prerogative to do whatever he wishes with his
land.
LARRY M. BuP.Drrr
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING IN METROPOLITAN AREAS
McDermott v. Village of Calverton Park1
On January 15, 1953, the Board of Trustees of Calverton Park2
adopted a zoning ordinance which, aside from providing for public build-
ings, parks, and golf courses, divided the city into four zoning districts.
Each district restricted lot usage to one-family dwellings, the differences
in the districts being in the amount of area covered by the lots.3 Beginning
in 1946 and continuing for a period of several years, the McDermotts pur-
chased adjoining lots in Calverton Park until they had acquired approxi-
mately two and one-half acres of land fronting on North Florissant Road.
By 1958, Florissant Road had become a heavily traveled four-lane highway,
and the McDermotts, displeased with the increased traffic, placed their
property up for sale.4 In January, 1963 they entered into a contract to sell
their property to Larry Witzer for $58,500 on condition that the McDer-
motts have the property rezoned so that a shopping center could be con-
structed thereon. The McDermotts' application for rezoning for commercial
use and a later request for a permit to build a shopping center on their prop-
erty were denied, and they filed suit to challenge the validity of the Calver-
ton Park zoning ordinance.5
Two issues were presented to the court. The first issue was whether
the earlier case of Moline Acres v. Heidbreder,6 should be overruled.7
There the Missouri Supreme Court held that a zoning ordinance limiting
property usage in an entire community to one-family dwellings was not in
accordance with a comprehensive plan as required by section 89.040, RSMo
1. 454 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
2. Calverton Park is a small community with a population of around 1,700
located in the outlying area near St. Louis.
3. 454 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 580.
6. 367 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1963).
7. 454 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
[Vol. 86
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1959.8 Secondly, the court was presented with the issue of whether the Mc-
Dermotts' rights under the fifth9 and fourteenthI0 amendments of the Con-
stitution of the United States and sections 1011 and 2812 of Article I of the
Missouri Constitution were violated in that the ordinance was arbitrary
and unreasonable.' 3
The McDermotts produced two real estate brokers who testified that
the highest and best use of the property was commercial. The testimony in-
dicated that the property had a value of $66,500 for commercial purposes
and no more than $17,000 for residential purposes.14 The defendant intro-
duced evidence to show that the residents of Calverton Park had easy access
to at least four commercial shopping facilities within a short distance of
the Village boundary line. Defendant also produced a city planning expert
who testified that, in his opinion, the Village was properly zoned and that
there were over ninety homes on Florissant Road, each of which was well
maintained and desirable as residential property.15
The court decided to overrule Moline Acres.16 That a comprehensive
plan would, in most instances, require commercial districts was conceded.
However, the court stated that St. Louis County is a unique situation
wherein there are large numbers of people working in the City of St.
Louis while living in the county in cities and villages designed primarily
for residential purposes.17 The court also stated that the comprehensive
8. § 89.040, RSMo (1959) [now cited as RSMo 1969] states:
Such regulation shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan
and designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire,
panic and other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to
provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to
avoid undue concentration of population; to preserve features of historical
significance; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water,
sewage, schools, parks, and other public requirements. Such regulations
shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the
character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and
with a view to conserving the values of buildings and encouraging the most
appropriate use of the land throughout such municipality.
9. U.S. CONsT. amend. V states: "[N] or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."
10. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 states: "[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. "
11. Mo. CONsr. art. I, § 10 states: "That no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law."
12. Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 28 states:
That private property shall not be taken for private use with or without
compensation, unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of
necessity, and except for drains and ditches across the lands of others for
agricultural and sanitary purposes, in the manner prescribed by law; and
that when an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged
to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be public shall
be judicially determined without regard to any legislative declaration that
the use is public.
13. 454 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
14. Id. at 580.
15. Id.
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plan requirements of section 89.04018 could be met by a one-use ordinance
such as the one in McDermott.19
In deciding the constitutional issue the court adopted a balancing ap-
proach. It balanced the financial loss to the McDermotts, if the ordinance
were allowed to stand, against the loss in property values throughout the
neighborhood and increased traffic problems that would result if a shopping
center should be constructed. The court concluded that the loss in property
values to the community, together with the increased traffic problems,
outweighed the financial loss to the McDermotts and that the ordinance,
therefore, was not arbitrary and unreasonable.2 0
The purpose of this note is to view McDermott in light of the conven-
tional standards that courts apply to determine the validity of zoning or-
dinances and in light of what may be a new trend in zoning law-deter-
mination of a zoning ordinance's validity on the basis of the discrimination
caused by the ordinance. To be valid, a zoning ordinance must be reason-
able, not arbitrary, and must bear a substantial relationship to public
health, safety, morals, and general welfare.21 Whether or not this test is met
has traditionally been determined on the basis of several well established
standards. First, does the ordinance help control population density, lessen
traffic congestion, lessen danger of fire, or reduce obstruction of light and
air?22 Second, is the public interest and welfare promoted by the ordinance
greater than the loss, in terms of property value, to the complaint?28 Finally,
how do the uses allowed by the ordinance compare with the usage of sur-
rounding property?2 4 The discriminatory aspect of zoning was recently rec-
18. See note 8 supra.
19. 454 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
20. Id. at 584.
21. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Central Bank
and Trust Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 392 -F.2d 549, 550 (5th Cir. 1968); American
National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 251,
254, 195 N.E.2d 627, 629 (1964); Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Mo.
En Banc 1965); State v. Wind, 337 S.W.2d 554, 561 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960); Opgal,
Inc. v. Bums, 9 N.Y.2d 659, 660, 173 N.E.2d 50 212 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1961); Landis v.
Zoning Board of Adjustment of Hatfield Township, 414 Pa. 146, 149, 198 A.2d 574,
575 (1964).
22. Enos v. City of Brockton, 354 Mass. 278, 282, 236 N.E.2d 919, 921-22
(1968); Price v. Cohen, 213 Md. 457, 464, 132 A.2d 125, 129 (1957); Huttig v. City
of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833, 838-41 (Mo. 1963); Landau v. Levin, 358
Mo. 77, 83, 213 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Mo. 1958); Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 41
N.J. Super. 47, 66, 124 A.2d 54, 64 (1956); State v. Bessent, 27 Wis.2d 457, 464, 132
N.W.2d 125, 129 (1957).
23. Johnson v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 839, 328 P.2d 71, 79 (1958);
Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Village of Franklin Park, 4 Ill.2d 304, 305-06, 122
N.E.2d 804, 806 (1954); McDermott v. Village of Calverton Park, 454 S.W.2d 577,
584 (Mo. En Banc 1970); Ewing v. City of Springfield, 449 S.W.2d 681, 689 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1970); Point Lookout Civic Ass'n v. Town of Hempstead, 22 Misc.2d 757,
762, 200 N.Y.S.2d 925, 928 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Buhler v. Racine County, 33 Wis.2d
137, 144-145, 146 N.W.2d 403, 407 (1966).
24. Cromwell-Franklin Oil Co. v. Oklahoma City, 14 F.Supp. 370, 379 (W.D.
Okla 1930); Robinson v. City of Los Angeles, 146 Cal. App. 2d 810, 816, 304 P.2d
814, 817 (1956); City of Littleton v. Quelland, 387 P.2d 814, 817 (Colo. 1963); Hut-
tig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Mo. 1963); Flora Realty
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ognized by the U.S. Commission on Urban Problems and was described in
the Commission's report as follows:
The abuses that such a multiplicity of government works on a
metropolitan area are many, and we need not list them all here.
One is discriminatory zoning that suburban towns adopt. Zoning,
which is barely a body of law, very effectively keeps the poor and
those with low incomes out of suburban areas by stipulating lot
sizes way beyond their economic reach. Many suburbs prohibit or
severely limit the construction of apartments, town houses, or
planned unit developments which could accommodate more people
in less space at potential savings in housing costs. Even where apart-
ments are allowed, they often are limited in size of dwelling unit,
effectively keeping out families with children who would presum-
ably place a burden on school budgets. Zoning is also used by most
suburban areas to keep out blue-collar industry which could go a
long way in providing the types of jobs low-income people could
take if they could afford to live in the suburbs. 25
The multiplicity of governments mentioned in the Commission report is
the result of an influx of low-income families to the central metropolitan
areas and an equally heavy flow of middle and upper-income-families from
central metropolitan areas into the suburbs.26 As a result of these popula-
tion shifts many new political units have been created to serve the needs
of the people. For example, in the Chicago metropolitan area there are
1,113 local governmental units; in Pittsburgh, 704; and in New York, 551.27
Zoning laws are passed by these individual governmental units without re-
gard for the outside world 28 with little thought given to providing a
balanced community for all economic levels.2 9
Discrimination of the type mentioned in the Commission report can
result from the exercise of such exclusionary zoning practices as large lot zon-
ing; zoning excluding certain uses such as apartment buildings, mobile home
parks, or commercial establishments; ordinances fixing minimum house size
requirements; and ordinances requiring contractors to meet high subdi-
vision requirements. 30 There is increasing recognition of the problems
created by exclusionary zoning. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania re-
cently held that a zoning ordinance which did not make any provision for
apartment buildings was unreasonable and unconstitutional. 31 The court
reasoned that the ordinance excluded people from the community who
and Investment Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 1039, 246 S.W.2d 771, 778(En Banc 1952); Nelkin v. Town of Oyster Bay, 14 Misc.2d 764, 765, 181
N.Y.S.2d 833, 835 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
25. U.S. COMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEmS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CrTY, H.R.
Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1969). [Hereinafter cited as Douglas
Report]
26. Id. at 7.
27. Id.
28. R. BABcocK, THE ZONING GAmE 19 (1966).
29. Douglas Report at 19.
30. Id. at 211-17.
31. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
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would otherwise be able to live there if apartments were available.3 2 The
U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems and the Presidents Commit-
tee on Urban Housing both refer to discrimination resulting from ex-
clusionary zoning.33 The Illinois Supreme Court has held unreasonable
the refusal of a community zoning board to allow construction of a mobile
home development.3 4 One factor considered by the Illinois court was the
need for low cost housing in the community.3 5 The problem has also been
given recognition in recent law review articles. 6
On the other hand, a recognized objective of zoning is preservation of
the character of the neighborhood and community.1 Also, ordinances
similar to the one in McDermott have been upheld in a number of other
jurisdictions.3 8 In Valley View Village v. Proffett39 a federal court of ap-
peals held that a one-use ordinance is not necessarily per se arbitrary and
unreasonable, but is to be judged by its impact upon property within the
community.4 0 In Connor v. Township of Chanhassen41 the Minnesota Su-
preme Court held that a community of 1,795 could maintain its rural
character against an expanding metropolitan area by zoning its entire area
farm-residential.42 In a case very similar to McDermott, the Florida Su-
preme Court upheld a zoning ordinance restricting property usage in a
municipality near Palm Beach to single family residences.4 3 The Florida
court relied on the fact that commercial facilities were conveniently located
near the municipality and that adjoining property values would be ad-
versely affected by commercial use of municipality property.4 4
Few courts have been willing to find that a zoning ordinance is in-
valid because it is discriminatory in the sense that it keeps people out of
32. Id. at 397, where the court stated:
[A]ppellee has in effect decided to zone out the people who would be
able to live in the Township if apartments were available. The question
posed is whether the township can stand in the way of the natural forces
which send our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in
search of a comfortable place to live. We have conduded not. A zoning
ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers
in order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the ad-
ministration of public services and facilities can not be held valid.
33. Douglas Report at 7-8; PRaEsmENrs CoAMMrtEE ON URBAN HOUSING, BUILD-
ING A DECENT HOME, Final Report of Presidents Committee on Urban Housing 140
(1969).
34. Lakeland Bluff, Inc. v. County of Will, 114 IlM. App.2d 267, 252 N.E.2d
765 (1969).
35. Id. at 279, 252 N.E.2d at 770.
36. Williams and Wacks, Segregation of Residential Areas Along Economic
Lines: Lionshead Lake Revisited, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 827; 45 Norm DAzN LAWYER
123 (1969).
37. 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 2 (1958).
38. Valley View Village v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955); Blank v.
Town of Lake Clarke Shores, 161 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1964); Connor v. Township of
Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957).
39. 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955).
40. Id. at 418.
41. Connor v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957).
42. Id. at 794-95.
43. Blank v. Town of Lake Clarke Shores, 161 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1964).
44. Id. at 685.
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the community. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is the exception.45
Missouri courts have not yet discussed this discriminatory aspect of zoning.
On the contrary, McDermott, in upholding a single-use zoning ordinance,46
recognized a type of exclusionary zoning that Missouri courts, theretofore,
had not recognized. It is submitted that when Missouri courts are presented
with the proper situation, discriminatory effects as well as traditional
standards should be considered before approving one-use exclusionary
zoning.
Several points, therefore, can be made in conclusion. First, under
proper circumstances, as existed in McDermott, a Missouri community
can zone its entire area single-family dwelling and still meet the statutory
requirement that zoning ordinances be based upon a comprehensive plan.
The court in McDermott seems to indicate that the proper circumstances
may exist only in St. Louis and Kansas City. The court points out that a
comprehensive plan will normally require a commercial district, but that
St. Louis County is a unique situation wherein large numbers of people
work in the city but live in the county in villages designed primarily for
residental purposes.47 Second, the Missouri Supreme Court has chosen
to judge the constitutionality of zoning ordinances by conventional stand-
ards.48 The court chose to weigh the increased traffic that would result and
the loss in community property values against the loss in property value to
the McDermotts.4 9 Third, exclusionary zoning ordinances can result in
discrimination by making it economically impossible for low income families
to live in a community. Although there is an increasing awareness as to
this aspect of zoning, the majority of courts passing on the validity of zon-
ing ordinances, including those in Missouri, rely on more conventional
standards such as the effect on population density, traffic congestion, and
property values.
DONALD G. CHEEVER
45. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
46. 454 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
47. Id. at 581.
48. See notes 25, 26, and 27 supra.
49. 454 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION ON
"DEEPLY HELD" MORAL AND ETHICAL GROUNDS
Welsh v. United States,
Petitioner, Elliot Ashton Welsh II, applied to his local selective service
board for conscientious objector exemption from military service under sec-
tion 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948.2
The section required that an applicant show that his objection to military
service is based on his "religious training and belief." The statute defined
"religious training and belief" as:
an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does
not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views
or a merely personal moral code. 3
In completing the exemption application, Welsh altered the statement
on the Selective Service form which read, "I am, by reason of my religious
training and belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form," by striking out the words "religious training and".4 He also answered
the question of whether he believed in a Supreme Being in the negative.5
Welsh's draft board classified him exempted from combatant training
and service, but refused to exempt him from non-combatant training and
service. Claiming exemption from all military duty, Welsh appealed the
local board's ruling.
In communications with the appeals board, Welsh characterized his
beliefs as "religious", but only in the ethical sense, as they stemmed from
sociological, economic, historical and philosophical considerations. 6 The
1. 598 U.S. 33 (1970).
2. Universal Military Training and Service Act § 6 (j), ch. 625, § 6 (j), 62
Stat. 612 (1948), as amended 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (j) (1967). § 6 (j) states:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person
to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the
United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscien-
tiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training
and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to
a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or
philosolhica views, or a merely personal moral code. Any person claiming
exempUon from combatant training and service because of such conscien-
tious objections whose claim is sustained by the local board shall, if he is
inducted into the armed forces under this tite, be assigned to noncom-
batant service as defined by the President, or shall, if he is found to be
conscientiously opposed to participation in such noncombatant service, in
lieu of such induction, be ordered by his local board, subject to such regu-ations as t e President may prescri e, to perform for a period equal to the
period prescribed in section 4(b) such civilian work contributing to the
maintenance of national health, safety, or interest as the local board may
deem appropriate....8. The text of the 1967 amendment of § 6 (j) of the 1948 Act is quoted at
note 28 infra.
4. Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1969).5. 898 U.S. at e7.6. Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1081a82 (9th Cir. 1969).
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appeals board ruled that Welsh was not entitled to any exemption under
section 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, 7
because his beliefs were not of the type contemplated by the statute. Shortly
thereafter, the local draft board reclassified him qualified for military
service.
Welsh received his induction order and reported to the induction cen-
ter, but when his name was called he refused to submit to induction. Prose-
cution followed and he was convicted in federal district court of refusing
to submit to induction into the armed forces. Welsh appealed his conviction
on the grounds that it was without any basis in fact and also that it was
based upon an unconstitutional distinction between theistic and non-theistic
beliefs. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction,
finding that while Welsh held his beliefs with the strength of more orthodox
religious convictions, "he denied that his objection to war was premised on
religious belieL"8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "chiefly to review the conten-
tion that Welsh's conviction should be set aside on the basis of this court's
decision in United States v. Seeger."9 Without reaching the constitutional
issues raised by the petitioner, the Court reversed the conviction "because of
its fundamental inconsistency with United States v. Seeger."1° Delivering
the judgment of the Court,11 Mr. Justice Black reasoned that the court of
appeals had erred, because Welsh's deeply held belief in the total im-
morality of all war was dearly sufficient to satisfy the source of belief test
enunciated in United States v. Seeger.'2 Thus Welsh had been wrongfully
denied conscientious objector status under 6 (j).
Firmly rooted in our national history is the policy of exempting from
military service those persons whose religious beliefs forbid them to par-
ticipate in war. In the Draft Act of 1917,13 Congress exempted from military
service persons affiliated with a "well recognized religious sect or organiza-
tion." The constitutionality of this act, including its conscientious objector
provisions, was upheld in the Selective Draft Law Cases of 1918.14
7. Universal Military Training and Service Act § 6 (j), ch. 625, § 6 (j), 62
Stat. 612 (1948), as amended 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (j) (1967) [hereinafter cited as
6 ()].
8. 404 F.2d at 1082 (9th Cir. 1969).
9. 398 U.S. at 335.
10. Id.
11. Mr. Justice Black announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion in which Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall joined. Mr. Justice Harlan
concurred in the result and filed an opinion. Mr. Justice White dissented and filed
an opinion in which Justice Stewart and Chief Justice Burger joined. Mr. Justice
Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
12. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
13. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 6, 40 Stat. 76. See also, Draft Act of Feb. 24,
1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 6, in which Congress granted conscientious objector ex-
emptions to:
members of religious denominations, who shall by oath or affirmation de-
clare that they are conscientiously opposed to the bearing of arms, and who
are prohibited from doing so by the rules and articles of faith and practice
of said religious denominations.
14. 245 U.S. 366 (1918). Directing its attention to the conscientious objector
provision of the 1917 Act, the Court stated:
And we pass without anything but statement the proposition that an es-
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By the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940,15 Congress signifi-
candy broadened the basis for granting exemptions by extending such to
any person "who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscien-
tiously opposed to participation in war in any form." This broader basis for
granting exemptions soon became the subject of judicial controversy. In
United States v. Kauten,'0 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit con-
strued the words "religious training and belief" to mean "a compelling
voice of conscience arising from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a
means of relating the individual to his fellowmen and to his universe." 17
Belief in a diety was not stated as a requirement for the granting of exemp-
tions on religious grounds. The implication that this court did not con-
sider such a requirement to exist became apparent in subsequent de-
cisions.18
In Berman v. United States19 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected Kauten's unorthodox interpretation of "religious training and
belief." The source of a registrant's beliefs, not the strength with which he
held them, was the determinative factor in qualifying for conscientious ob-
jector exemption.2 0 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes' definition of religion in United States v. Macintosh.21
Hughes said that "[t]he essence of religion is belief in a relation to God
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." 22
It was with this split of judicial interpretation in view that Congress
enacted 6 (j). Congress, citing Berman v. United States23 adopted the defini-
tion of religion provided in Macintosh with two modifications: (1) the
term "Supreme Being" was substituted for the term "God"; (2) political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code were
expressly excluded as bases for exemption.
tablishment of a religion or an interference with the free exercise thereof
repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of
the act to which we at the outset referred, because we think its unsoundness
is too apparent to require us to do more. Id. at 389-90.
15. Act of Sept 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5 (g), 54 Stat. 885.
16. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
17. Id. at 708.
18. See United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2dCir. 1943),
and United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944), which are the
same in princple as Kauten, although they are habeas corpus proceedings.
19. 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946) (Denman, dis-
senting).
20. Id. at 381. The court stated its conclusion as follows:
It is our opinion that the expression "by reason of religious training and
belief" is clear language, and was written into the statute for the specific
purpose of distinguishing between a conscientious social belief, or a sincere
devotion to a high moralistic philosophy, and one based upon an indi-
vidual's belief in his responsibility to an authority higher and beyond any
worldly one.... (N]o matter how pure and admirable his standard may
be, and no matter how devotedly he adheres to it, his philosophy and
morals and social policy without the concept of deity cannot be said to be
religious in the sense of that term as it is used in the statute.
21. 283 U.S. 605 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 613.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [1971], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss2/6
RECENT CASES
Section 6 (j) did not again become the subject of serious judicial con-
cern until 1964, when the trilogy of cases cited as United States v. Seeger,2 4
came before the Supreme Court. In Seeger the Court was called upon to de-
termine whether the unorthodox beliefs of the registrants fell within the
purview of 6 (j). The strength with which the parties held their beliefs was
not at issue.
After perusing the legislative history of 6 (j) and the historical origins of
conscientious objector exemption, the Court concluded that Congress had
not intended to limit exemption on religious grounds to only those regis-
trants holding an orthodox belief in God.25 Stressing Congress' substitution
of the all-inclusive term "Supreme Being", the Court arrived at the follow-
ing test for source of belief under 6 (j):
We believe that under this construction, the test of belief "in a
relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a given belief that is sin-
cere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who
clearly qualifies for the exemption.26
The Court's use of statutory construction to arrive at its decision in
Seeger was apparently motivated by the desire to avoid the issue of whether
6 (j) violated the religious clauses of the first amendment by (1) not exempt-
ing non-religious conscientious objectors and (2) discriminating between
theistic and non-theistic beliefs. While the use of statutory construction was
not fully consistent with an objective reading of the legislative history, it
was logically defensible since none of the parties claimed to be an atheist.
Had this not been so, and "if one of the parties were an atheist, quite
different problems would be presented."2 7 The problems alluded to by Mr.
Justice Douglas were inherent in the implicit theistic bias of 6 (j); and,
while the broad meaning given to "Supreme Being" in Seeger significantly
narrowed the express exceptions to the Supreme Being test, it did not obvi-
ate the section's discrimination between theistic and non-theistic beliefs.
Before Welsh, and in response to Seeger, Congress amended 6 (0) as
follows:
As used in this section, the term "religious training and belief" does
not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views, or a merely personal moral code.2 8
By deleting reference to a Supreme Being, Congress tailored the statu-
tory language to fit the test of belief in Seeger. However, the amendment's
legislative history demonstrated a congressional desire to reaffirm the
theistic requirement of the original section and to continue to exclude
24. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
25. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 165, 173-76 (1965).
26. Id. at 165-66.
27. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 193 n.2 (1965) (Douglas, J., con-
curring).
28. Selective Service Act of 1967, ch. 625, § 6 (j), 62 Stat. 612, as amended, 50
U.S.C. APP. § 456 (j) (1967).
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secular conscientious beliefs.20 The decision in Welsh is dearly at odds
with this expression of congressional intent.
In evaluating the extent to which Welsh expanded the Seeger decision,
attempts to distinguish the source of Welsh's beliefs from those of the par-
ties in Seeger accomplishes little. The most that can be stated with any cer-
tainty is that Welsh, in characterizing his conscientious beliefs, was more in-
sistent that they were devoid of any religious basis. Although Welsh never
stated that he was an atheist, the court of appeals distinguished Seeger
on this point.
This distinction was not without merit given the Court's statement in
Seeger that "[iun such an intensely personal area, of course, the claim of
the registrant that his belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be
given great weight."3 0 But Mr. Justice Black was quick to point out that
the converse of this statement was not true, i.e., a registrant's characteriza-
tion of his beliefs as non-religious does not carry equal weight. Such a dis-
tinction would be "a highly unreliable guide for those charged with ad-
ministering the exemption." 31
Had the Court stopped in its analysis after concluding that Welsh's be-
liefs satisfied the Seeger test, Welsh would not have constituted a significant
extension of Seeger. Instead, the Court carried the Seeger rationale to its
logical extreme. A new test for determining whether the source of a regis-
trant's belief comes within the purview of 6 (j) was enunciated:
That section exempts from military service all those whose con-
sciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs,
would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to be-
come a part of an instrument of war.3 2
Including "deeply held" moral and ethical beliefs within the perimeter of
exemption under 6 (j) eliminated the remaining exceptions to the "Su-
preme Being" test and ridded 6 (j) of its constitutionally troublesome dis-
crimination between theistic and non-theistic "religious" beliefs.
The reasons which seem to have prompted the Court to render its
decision without reaching the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner
were well founded. The question of whether exemption from military
service on religious grounds rises to the level of a constitutionally guaranteed
29. See CONF. REP. No. 346, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1967), which stated:
The Senate conferees also concurred in the desire of the House language
to more narrowly construe the basis for classifying registrants as "conscien-
tious objectors." The recommended House language required that the
claim for conscientious objection must be based upon "religious traiiing
and belief" as had been the original intent of Congress in drafting this
provision of the law.
The Senate conferees were of the opinion that congressional intent in this
area would be clarified by the inclusion of language indicating that the
term "religious training and belief" as used in this section of the law does
not include "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a
merely personal moral code."
30. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965).
31. 398 U.S. at 341.
32. Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
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right under the first amendment has never been decided by the Court. The
Court has, however, expressed by dictum its unwillingness to make such a
declaration. In light of this fact, the continued existence of such an exemp-
tion depends entirely upon the constitutional validity of 6 (j).33 Therefore,
while it may be successfully argued that Congress, in choosing to grant
exemptions, must do so without discriminating between theistic and non-
theistic religions, it does not follow a fortiori that Congress can be com-
pelled to grant exemptions upon grounds with which it does not agree.
Recognizing this dilemma, the Court chose to avoid the constitutional
challenge to 6 () and not endanger the continued existence of conscientious
objector exemption.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with the ma-
jority's use of statutory construction as the means for obviating 6 (j)'s the-
istic bias.3 4 Rather, he would have employed the broad severability clause
of the act35 to accomplish the same results. This, he argued, would have
avoided the cynicism displayed toward the constitutionality of 6 () in the
majority opinion. Harlan stated that the exclusion of non-theistic religious
beliefs by Congress had violated the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment, which required governmental neutrality in the area of religious be-
lief. This "under-inclusion" of religious beliefs by 6 (0) was correctible by
severance of that portion excluding secular conscientious beliefs and with-
out rendering the entire exemption void. •
The logical inconsistencies suffered by the majority opinion could, per-
haps, have been avoided by severance of the offensive language; but in
using this approach, one must assume that the section's remaining language
has meaning standing alone. This assumption loses strength in light of
the legislative history of 6 (), which indicates that Congress intended that
belief in a diety form the gravamen of exemption from military service "by
reason of religious training and belief."3 6 In evaluating the merits of either
approach, one concludes that both entail equal disregard for congressional
intent. However, severance is a more straightforward method of correcting
the infirmities of 6 () and does avoid the labored reasoning of the majority.
The dissenting opinion3 7 provides an indication of the divergence of
opinion on the conscientious objector issue. In his opinion Mr. Justice
White gives an insight into the constitutional problems presented by Con-
gress' desire to base the qualification for a conscientious objector exemption
on theistic religious grounds. Although noting the past unwillingness to
33. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 624 (1931); Hamilton v. Regents,
293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934). But see United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D.
Mass. 1969). appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 399 U.S. 267 (1970), where
the district court held that the petitioner's right to exemption on conscientious
grounds was constitutionally guaranteed under the first amendment.
34. 398 U.S. at 344.
35. Act of June 19, 1951, ch. 144, § 5, 65 Stat. 88.
36. See Mr. Justice Harlan's discussion of the legislative history of 6 () in
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. at 348-50, in which he states, in part:
The natural reading of § 6 (j), which quite evidently draws a distinction
between theistic and non-theistic religions, is the only one that is consistent
with the legislative history. Id. at 348.
37. 398 U.S. at 367.
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declare conscientious objector exemption a first amendment right,3 8 he
states that "there is an arguable basis for § 6 (j) in the Free Exercise
Clause... ."39 But he could find no merit in Harlan's conclusion that the
exclusion of non-religious conscientious objectors constituted a violation of
the establishment clause. He concluded that the Court "should ... not labor
to find a violation of the Establishment Clause when free exercise values
prompt Congress to relieve religious believers from the burdens of the
aw ...... "40
The term "religion" or "religious" is a nebulous concept, 4 1 and much
of the dissent's arguments rests upon the assumption that these words have
definable contours. In short, there are beliefs, regardless of the strength of
conviction, that cannot be considered "religious" in the sense that term is
intended in the first amendment. It is this point of analysis that seems to be
the focal point for the divergence of opinion on the establishment issue.
While conscientious objection, as indicated by the dissent, may have a free
exercise clause claim to constitutional status, whether it has a similar daim
on establishment grounds remains unanswered after Welsh.42
The 1967 amendment of 6 (j) was not a fundamental change from the
original section. Albeit the amended section is technically unaffected, the
opinion in Welsh is sufficiently broad in scope to apply with equal force.43
Two groups of registrants who will continue to fall within the ex-
clusions are:
those whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection
to war does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle
but instead rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism,
or expediency.44
The Court has now construed the test for conscientious objector status so
broadly that the establishment issue will remain dormant and a registrant,
whose "deeply held" conscientious beliefs forbid him participation in all
wars, will be entitled to an exemption under 6 (j).
DENis L. DAvis
38. See cases cited note 3 supra.
39. 398 U.S. at 371.
40. Id. at 373.
41. See Mr. Justice Clark's discussion of the "ever-broadening understanding"
of religion in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180-84 (1965).
42. This question has been answered in the negative by the Court in its recent
decision on the "selective" conscientious objector issue. See Gillette v. United States,
- U.S. -, 39 U.S.L.W. 4305 (U.S. March 8, 1971). However, this sort of claim
to conscientious objector exemption is sui generis; and "selective" objection to only
the war in Viet Nam seems clearly to be based upon policy or political reasons. In
disposing of the petitioners' contention that to deny their right to conscientiously
object to the Viet Nam War would constitute an establishment of religion, the Court
in Gillette stated:
We conclude that it is supportable for Congress to have decided that the
objector to all war-to all killing in war-has a claim that is distinct
enough and intense enough to justify special status, while the objector to a
particular war does not. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4312.
43. See Morico v. United States, 399 U.S. 526 (per curiam 1970); Gilliam v.
Resor, 407 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 933 (1970).
44. 398 U.S. at 342-43.
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LITIGATION EXPENSES INCURRED IN APPRAISING
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS' STOCK ARE NOT DEDUCTIBLE
Woodward v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue1
Hilton Hotels Corp. v. United States2
In every state, with the exception of West Virginia, there are statutes
which give minority stockholders who dissent from certain corporate trans-
actions the right to receive payment for their stock.3 The types of trans-
actions covered by the statutes vary; often included are charter amendment,
merger, consolidation, and sale of assets.4 The parties are given the right to
go to court and obtain an impartial appraisal if they are unable to agree on
the value of the stock.5 The Supreme Court, in two recent cases, held that
the litigation expenses incurred by purchasers in appraisal proceedings aris-
ing under these statutes were non-deductible for federal income tax pur-
poses.6
In Woodward v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the taxpayers were
the majority stockholders of the Telegraph-Herald, an Iowa publishing cor-
poration. They voted their controlling shares in favor of a proposal to extend
the corporate charter perpetually. A minority stockholder voted against the
extension and, as a result, the majority stockholders were required by Iowa
law to purchase the dissenting shareholder's stock at its "real value."T The
parties were unable to agree on the value of the stock, and taxpayers brought
an action in state court for an appraisal. After extensive litigation, a value
was fixed, and the taxpayers purchased the dissenter's stock.8
In 1963, taxpayers paid out over $25,000 for various expenses connected
with the litigation. They deducted this amount on their 1963 federal income
tax returns, claiming that the expenses were "ordinary and necessary" ex-
penses paid ". . .for the management, conservation, or maintenance of prop-
erty held for the production of income," and therefore deductible under
section 212 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 9 The Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue disallowed the deductions on the theory that the expenses
were "capital expenditures incurred in connection with the acquisition of
1. 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
2. 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
3. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar ANN. § 73 (1960). See generally §§ 351.090,
.205, A05, and .455, RSMo 1969.
4. 55 MICH. L. Rv. 689 (1957).
5. Id.
6. For a listing of law review articles on these appraisal statutes, and citations
to the statutes for each state, see the MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN., supra note 3, at
§ 74.
7. IowA. CODE ANN. § 491.25 (1949).
8. Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 133 N.W.2d 38, modified on rehear-
ing, 257 Iowa 1104, 136 N.W.2d 280 (1965).
9. INT. Rav. CODE Of 1954, § 212 (in part):
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-
(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held for the production of income....
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capital stock of a corporation," and therefore not deductible.' 0 The taxpay-
ers appealed to the Tax Court, where the Commissioner's determination was
upheld, with two dissenting opinions."' The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.12
The objection of the dissenting shareholders in Hilton Hotels Corp. v.
United States, on the other hand, was to a proposed merger between the
Hilton Hotels Corporation and the Waldorf-Astoria Corporation. Hilton, as
the surviving corporation, was to offer 1.25 shares of Hilton stock for every
share of Waldorf stock not already held by Hilton. Hilton owned ap-
proximately 90% of the Waldorf stock and it voted this majority in favor of
the merger. However, the owners of about 6% of the Waldorf shares objected
to the merger and demanded payment for their stock as provided by New
York law.1 s As in Woodward, the parties could not agree on the stock's value
and the dissenters commenced appraisal proceedings in the New York
courts.14 After settlement of the litigation, Hilton deducted the fees con-
nected with the appraisal proceedings as "ordinary and necessary business
expenses," deductible under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.15
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deduction on the
grounds that the expenses were capital expenditures. The corporate tax-
payer, after paying the tax, sued for a refund in district court.' 6 There the
Commissioner's determination was overruled, and the taxpayer's deduction
upheld.' 7 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the de-
cision.' 8
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Marshall, resolved the
seemingly conflicting decisions by holding in both cases that litigation ex-
penses incurred in connection with the appraisal of dissenting shareholders'
stock had their origin in the acquisition of a capital asset and were non-de-
ductible capital expenditures. Woodward was affirmed,19 and Hilton re-
versed.20
While Woodward and Hilton are factually similar, they do have two
factual distinctions which could have allowed the Supreme Court to affirm
both decisions without, arguably, being inconsistent. Most obvious is the
fact that the deductions in the cases were claimed under two different sec-
tions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The other distinction is that in
Woodward title remained in the minority stockholder after she registered
her dissent, while in Hilton title immediately passed to the corporation. 2 '
10. 397 U.S. 572, 574 (1970).
11. Fred W. Woodward, 49 T.C. 377 (1968).
12. Woodward v. Comm'r, 410 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1969).
13. N.Y. STOCK CoR'. LAw § 91 (McKinney 1951).
14. Id., § 21.
15. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162 (in part):
"There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary ex-
penses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business."
16. 397 U.S. 580, 582 (1970).
17. Hilton Hotels v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. IM. 1968).
18. Hilton Hotels Corp. v. United States, 410 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1969).
19. 397 U.S. 572, 579 (1970).
20. 397 U.S. 580, 583 (1970).
21. Id. at 583.
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This was due to the difference between Iowa and New York law. The Su-
preme Court brushed aside this distinction, 22 and it is of considerably less
importance than the difference between section 162 and section 212 of the
Internal Revenue Code.
These two sections differ in that section 162 applies to the expenses of a
trade or business, while section 212 applies to the non-business profit mak-
ing expenses of an individual.23 Both sections are substantially identical to
their immediate predecessors, sections 28 (a) (1) and 28 (a) (2) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939. Originally, however, the 1939 Code did not allow
deductions for the non-business profit making expenses of an individual,
even though the income resulting from such expenses was taxed.24 Recogniz-
ing the unfairness of this to the individual taxpayer, Congress, in section 121
of the Revenue Act of 1942, sought to remedy the inequity by adding section
23 (a) (2) to the Code.25 In construing the relationship between the two sec-
tions, the Supreme Court has held them to be comparable and in pari ma-
teria,26 and said that "it was manifestly Congress' purpose with respect to
deductibility to place all income-producing activities on an equal footing."2' 7
Deductions under section 212 are therefore to be "coextensive" with those
under section 162 and "subject to the same limitations and restrictions."28
Previous federal court decisions have been in conflict on the question of
deductibility of litigation expenses incurred in appraisal proceedings, with
the greater weight of authority holding them deductible. 29 Deductions have
been allowed under both section 162 and section 212. However, the cases
allowing deductions under section 212 have all involved individual taxpayers
who were on the selling side of the appraisal proceeding; 30 the only deduc-
tion that has been granted to the purchasing side of the transaction has come
under section 162.31 As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit pointed
out in Woodward, when viewed from the purchaser's side it is difficult to
see just what property held for the production of income the taxpayers are
trying to conserve. 32 The lower court did not say how they would have de-
22. Id. at 584.
23. 397 U.S. 572, 575 (1970).
24. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 44, 45 (1963).
25. Id. at 45; Trust of Bingham v. Conm'r, 325 U.S. 365, 368 (1945); Lykes
v. United States, 343 U.S. 118, 121 (1952). See H.R. RFP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 46 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 87-88 (1942).
26. Trust of Bingham v. Comm'r, 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
27. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963).
28. Id. at 45. See Iowa S. Util. Co. v. Comm'r, 333 F.2d 382, 386 (8th Cir.
1964).
29. Decisions holding the expenses deductible are Stempfel v. United States,
23 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 684 (M.D. Tenn. 1969), rev'd sub nom., as a result of the
decisions in Woodward and Hilton; Third Natl Bank in Nashville v. United States,
25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1970); Smith Hotel Enterprises, Inc. v. Nelson,
236 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1964) ; and Heller v. Comm'r, 2 T.C 371 (1943), affd,
147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945). See ilso Vermont Bank
and Trust Co. v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 682 (D. Vt. 1969). Rolding the expenses
to be capital expenditures is Boulder Bldg. Corp v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 512
(W.D. Okla. 1954).
30. Stempfel v. United States, 23 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 694 (M.D. Tenn. 1969);
Heller v. Comm'r, 2 T.C. 371 (1943).
31. Smith Hotel Enterprises, Inc. v. Nelson, 236 F. SuFp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1964).
32. Woodward v. Comm'r, 410 F.2d 313, 318 (8th Cir 1969).
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cided Woodward if the taxpayers had been sellers, but did distinguish the
positions by saying that in such a case "[t]here is not the conceptual diffi-
culty with the phrase, property held for the production of income, that is
present here."'3 3 Stampfel v. United States,3 4 a case granting a deduction to a
seller claiming under section 212, similarly distinguished between the posi-
tion of the seller and that of the purchaser. While this reasoning is entirely
logical in terms of the wording of section 212, it seems to run counter to the
legislative purpose and judicial interpretation of the legislation. Fortunately,
the Supreme Court based its decision on other grounds, for a deduction al-
lowed to a corporate purchaser of stock under section 162 and disallowed to
an individual purchaser under section 212 would hardly put "all income-
producing activities on an equal footing."3 5
The Supreme Court considered the expenses here to be non-deductible
because they were capital expenditures. This class of expenses has been non-
deductible ever since the modem federal income tax came into being in
1913. 80 Although section 263 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is en-
titled "Capital Expenditures,"37 there is no single definition of the term in
the Code.38 Section 261 of the Code, however, makes clear that section 263
is an overriding section; that is, once an item is classified as a capital ex-
penditure under section 263 it can not be considered deductible, even though
it also happens to fit the "ordinary and necessary" provisions of sections 162
and 212.89
The main problem for the taxpayers in both Hilton and Woodward
was to keep the litigation expenses from being classified as capital expendi-
tures. Had they been able to do this, the expenses would probably have been
deductible under either section. As mentioned, the Supreme Court has con-
strued section 212 in terms of its purpose rather than its literal meaning,40
and the qualifying term "ordinary and necessary expenses," found in both
sections, has been held not to require that the expenses be habitual or
normal in the sense of occurring often, but rather that they be "the common
and accepted means of defense against attack."4 '
Whether litigation expenses of this type were capital expenditures or not
depended on the Court's construction of Treasury Regulations 1.263 (a)-2 (a)
33. Id. at 319.
34. 23 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 684 (D.C. Tenn. 1969).
35. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963).
36. 397 U.S. 572, 574 (1970).
37. INT. PEv. CODE OF 1954, § 263 (in part):
No deductions shall be allowed for- (1) Any amount paid out for new
building or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase
the value of any property or estate....
38. Mcdonald, Deduction of Attorneys' Fees for Federal Income Tax Purposes,
103 U. PA. L. Rav, 168, 172 (1954).
39. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 261; Winokur, Deductibility of Legal and Other
Professional Fees, T3. So. CAL. 1963 TAx INsT. 457, 458. See also Woodward v.
Comm'r, 410 F.2d 311, 318 (8th Cir. 1969), and Bowers v. Lumpkin, 140 F.2d 927
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944).
40. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963); Trust of Bingham v. Comm'r,
325 U.S. 365 (1945).
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and 1.263 (a)-2 (c). 42 These and other Treasury Regulations considerably
broaden and clarify the scope of the term "capital expenditures" found in
section 268. 43 Regulation 1.263 (a)-2 (a) provides that "the cost of acquisi-
tion, construction, or erection of buildings, machinery and equipment, furni-
ture and fixtures, and similar property having a useful life substantially be-
yond the taxable year" is a capital expenditure.4 4 The Court noted that this
provision has been used by the courts to hold that "legal, brokerage, ac-
counting, and similar costs incurred in the acquisition or disposition of such
property are capital expenditures." 45
Treasury Regulation 1.263 (a)-2 (c) states simply that "the cost of de-
fending or perfecting title to property" is a capital expenditure. If this
regulation were rigorously applied, all litigation expenses might be capi-
talized, since "any lawsuit brought against a taxpayer may affect his title to
property.. .. "46 The courts have not held that Congress meant for all litiga-
tion expenses to be capitalized. In order to lessen the potential severity of
this regulation, the courts have developed a method of analysis known as the
"primary purpose" test.47 Under this test, if the primary purpose of the liti-
gation is the defense or perfection of title, the litigation expenses are capital
expenditures; however, if the defense or perfection of title is not the primary
purpose of the litigation, and title is only incidentally involved, the litigation
expenses may be deductible. 48 The main foundation of the taxpayers' argu-
ments in both Hilton and Woodward was that this test should be applied to
litigation involving the appraisal of dissenting shareholders' stock.
The taxpayers in Woodward urged that the test be extended and ap-
plied not only to cases directly involving defense or perfection of title, but
to cases involving the cost of acquisition of a capital asset as well.4 9 Their
argument was that the primary purpose of the litigation was not the acqui-
sition of the stock, but the appraisal of its value, and that title was only in-
cidentally involved since it was predetermined that it would pass to the ma-
jority stockholders.6 0 The same argument was advanced in Hilton from a
somewhat stronger position; under the provisions of New York law title
passed at the time the dissenters filed their objections.5 1 This factual dis-
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.263 (a)-2 (a) (1958); Treas. Reg. § 1.263 (a)-2 (c) (1958).
43. Winokur, supra note 39, at 458-59.
44. This regulation, as cited by the Court, provides that "[the cost of acquisi-
tion.., of ... property having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year"
is a capital expenditure. 397 U.S. 572, 575 (1970). This seems to read much more
unfavorably to the taxpayer than the regulation quoted in its entirety, and appears
very selective in the choice of words omitted.
45. 397 U.S. 572, 576 (1970). See 4A MERTENs, LAw OF FEDERA.L INco TAXA-
TION § 25.26 (1966).
46. 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
47. Id. at 576-77. See Iowa Southern Utilities Co. v. Comm'r, 333 F.2d 382
(8th Cir. 1964); Indus. Aggregate Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1960);
Shipp v. Commr, 217 F.2d 401, 402 (9th Cir. 1954); Rassenfoss v. Comm'r, 158
F.2d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 1946). See generally 4A MERTENS, L W OF FEmERL INcoiME
TAXAToN § 25.26 (1966).
48. Indus. Aggregate Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 639, 645 (8th Cir. 1960).
49. 397 U.S. 572, 577 (1970).
50. Id.
51. 397 U.S. 580, 583 (1970).
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tinction put the dissenters in the position of being Hilton's creditors,52 and
allowed Hilton to argue both (1) that the question of title was remote rather
than primary, and (2) that the litigation expenses were not part of the cost
of acquisition of a capital asset, since the asset had already been acquired.
The difference in result in the two cases in the courts of appeals was due
to the fact that in Hilton the "primary purpose" test was accepted, 53 while
in Woodward it was rejected as having no applicability to a case involving
the cost of acquisition of property. 54
There is some indication that even if the "primary purpose" test had
been accepted in Woodward, the two courts would still have reached an in-
consistent result. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, while refusing to
apply the test, also indicated that if it did apply the test the taxpayer would
not prevail.5 5 The court felt the primary purpose of the litigation was to
purchase the property, and the expenses were therefore "directly connected
with the purchase of property." 56 In Hilton, on the other hand, the primary
purpose of the appraisal proceedings was considered to be the determination
of the fair value of the shares.57
Similar inconsistent results sometimes occur under the "primary pur-
pose" test,58 for determining the primary purpose of litigation is often a dif-
ficult task. The instigator and the defender of litigation, for example, both
have purposes; if they are not the same there is sometimes a problem in
choosing whose is to govern.59 In addition, atempting to find the primary
purpose presents the problem of where to look; the pleadings, the evidence,
the eventual outcome, or some other aspect of the litigation may hold the
solution.6 0 Instead of unduly faulting the test, however, the real problem
most often seems the facts of the cases themselves. A multiplicity of factual
situations abound in this area, and each case must be analyzed in view of its
own peculiar facts.6 ' The dividing line between an expense that is "ordinary
and necessary" and one that is incurred in the "defense or perfection of title
to property" is often extremely narrow,62 and the complex fact situations
make it more difficult to draw that line. The decisive distinctions found. are
"those of degree and not of kind."63 As Judge Blackmun pointed out in
52. Id.
53. Hilton Hotels Corp. v. United States, 410 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1969).
54. Woodward v. Comm'r, 410 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1969).
55. Id. at 317.
56. Id.
57. Hilton Hotels Corp. v. United States, 410 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1969).
See Smith Hotel Enterprises, Inc. v. Nelson, 236 F. Supp. 303, 305-306 (E.D.
Wis. 1964).
58. Compare United States v. Pate, 254 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1958), with
Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 373 (Ct. Cl. 1960); and
Allen v. Selig, 200 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1952), with Garrett v. Crenshaw, 196 F.2d 185
(4th Cir. 1952).
59. Indus. Aggregate Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 639, 646 (8th Cir. 1960).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 645, note 10. See also Iowa Southern Util. Co. v. Comm'r, 333 F.2d
382,385 (8th Cir. 1964).
62. Rassenfoss v. Comm'r, 158 F.2d 764, 766 (7th Cir. 1946); Sergievsky v. Mc-
Namara, 135 F. Supp. 233, 237 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
63. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933); Hilton Hotels Corp. v.
United States, 410 F.2d 194, 196 (7th Cir. 1969).
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Iowa Southern Utilities Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 4 "the
inconsistency, if it exists at all, may, however, not possess real depth or sig-
nificance... there is no "ready touchstone" for every conceivable and vari-
able fact situation." 65 This seems an accurate summation, for the test has
often worked quite well in preventing undue hardship to taxpayers.
The Supreme Court, however, refused to apply the "primary purpose"
test in Woodward and Hilton, and expressed its disapproval of any exten-
sion of this subjective test beyond cases in which the question of whether the
taxpayer was actually defending or perfecting title to property is a definite
issue. The Court considered the test difficult and uncertain, and one that
failed to draw a "bright line."6 6 While the uncertainty and difficulty would
not seem to lie in the test so much as in other factors, the Court dearly pre-
fers another method of analysis.
The standard for characterizing litigation expenses preferred by the
Court is that most recently adopted in United States v. Gilmore.07 This
standard looks to the origin of the claim litigated, rather than to its purpose
or consequences, 68 and is an "objective standard of deductibility."6 9 The ap-
proach is hardly a new one; it seems to have appeared first in Kornhauser v.
United States,70 and more recently in Deputy v. du Pont71 and Lykes v.
United States.72
In Kornhauser, the Supreme Court granted a deduction, as a business
expense, for the litigation expenses incurred by a taxpayer in defending a
suit for an accounting brought by a former co-partner. The co-partner
wanted a division of some stock held by the taxpayer, claiming that it had
been received as compensation for services rendered during the existence of
the partnership. The Court held the litigation expenses to be business ex-
pensesrather than personal expenses, because they were "directly connected
with, or... proximately resulted from, his business."'78
In Deputy v. du Pont, an individual taxpayer was denied a deduction
for expenses incurred in borrowing stock. The stock was to be sold to execu-
tives of the du Pont Company, in order to give them a financial interest in
the company. The Court said it was "the origin of the liability out of which
the expense accrues which is material,"7 4 and noted that the expenses did
"not meet the test enunciated in Kornhauser v. United States, since they
64. 333 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1964).
65. Id. at 386.
66. 397 U.S. 572, 576-77 (1970).
67. 372 U.S. 39 (1963). And see United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53 (1963),
Gilmore's companion case.
68. 397 U.S. 572, 578 (1970); United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 48 (1965).
69. Anchor Coupling Co. v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1282, 1285
(7th Cir. 1970).
70. 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
71. 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
72. 343 U.S. 118 (1952). See generally 8 ST. L. L. J. 487 (1964).
73. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928). The taxpayer suc-
cessfully defeated his former co-partner's claim.
74. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 494 (1940).
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proximately result not from the taxpayer's business but from the business
of the du Pont Company." 75
Both Lykes v. United States and United States v. Gilmore denied deduc-
tions for legal expenses, under section 212 and its predecessor, section
23 (a) (2), on the ground that the expenses were personal in origin. In Lykes,
the taxpayer incurred litigation expenses in contesting a sizeable gift tax
deficiency that resulted from a large gift of stock to his childern. An adverse
decision would probably have forced the taxpayer to sell his remaining
stock. The Court refused to take this into consideration and said the legal
expense "was not proximately related to the production of income," and was
personal in nature because it was caused by the gift.76
The legal expenses in Gilmore were incurred in divorce litigation. The
taxpayer claimed deduction for that part of the litigation expenses incurred
in defeating his wife's claims to his income-producing property. Had his wife
been successful, the taxpayer might have lost his controlling stock interests
and corporate positions in three franchised automobile dealerships. The
Supreme Court citing Kornhauser, Lykes, and du Pont, said:
the principle we derive from these cases is that the characterization,
as 'business' or 'personal,' of the litigation costs of resisting a claim
depends on whether or not the claim arises in connection with the
taxpayer's profit-seeking activities. It does not depend on the con-
sequences that might result to a taxpayer's income-producing prop-
erty from a failure to defeat the claim....77
The Court then held the expenses non-deductible because they "stemmed
entirely from the marital relationship" and were personal in nature.78
The Woodward and Hilton decisions broke new ground for the "origin
of the claim" test. It had only been used previously, in the field of litigation
expenses, to determine whether the expenses were personal in nature or
whether they had their origin in business or income-producing activities. It
appeared from Gilmore that the test might be confined to this area, and at
least one federal case after Gilmore, Vermont Bank and Trust Co. v. United
States,70 held that its application was limited.8 0 Now, by using the test in
connection with Treasury Regulation 1.263 (a)-2 (a) to determine if a litiga-
tion expense had its origin in the cost of acquisition of a capital asset, the
Court has considerably broadened its application in this field. It would now
appear to be the controlling method of approach in all cases involving de-
ductibility of litigation expenses which do not appear related to "de-
fending or perfecting of title."81 Conceivably, it may be used in determining
the deductibility of other expenses, not related to litigation, as well.
75. Id. at 493-94. This case was decided prior to the amendment of the 1939
Code by the addition of section 23 (a) (2).
76. Lykes v. United States, 843 U.S. 118, 124 (1952).
77. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 48 (1963).
78. Id. at 51.
79. 296 F. Supp. 682 (D. Vt. 1969).
80. Id. at 685.
81. See 397 U.S. 572, 577 (1970).
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It is obvious that the Court believes the "origin of the claim" test to be
a simpler and more reliable standard than one based on the primary pur-
pose of the litigation.8 2 This simplicity may, however, be largely a result
of the fact that it has not been applied too often and is thus less clouded by
decisions which seemingly conflict. A conflicting decision, for example, could
have been produced in Woodward and Hilton under the "origin of the
claim" test. The Supreme Court, for example, could easily have held that
the expenses had their origin in the corporate merger,88 and ordinarily
"expenses incurred in reorganizing or recapitalizing a corporation are not
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses."8 4 Under this reason-
ing, the claim in Woodward originated in a "profit-seeking activity-the
renewal of a corporate charter,"8 5 and could be deductible. This, of course,
would create an inconsistent result and allow a deduction under section 212
after denying one under section 162. It is suggested that the origin of the
claim may on occasion prove as difficult to determine as the primary pur-
pose of the litigation.
An additional problem with the "origin of the claim" test should be
mentioned. The "primary purpose" test has kept Treasury Regulation
1.263 (a)-2 (c) from being applied too rigorously. Construing Treasury Regu-
lation 1.263 (a)-2 (a) in terms of the origin of the claim, however, provides no
such guarantee against severe application, even though "an inflexible ap-
plication of the rule that expenses incurred in connection with acquisi-
tions ... are capital expenditures" contains the same defect, in terms of
potential hardship, as an inflexible application of the rule that "expenses in
curred in defense or perfection of title" are capital expenditures.8 6
If the test is severely applied, expenses very remotely connected with the ac-
quisition of a capital asset may now be found to be capital expenditures be-
cause that is where they had their origin. As the dissenting opinion in Lykes
points out, "[s] o treacherous is this kind of reasoning that in most fields the
law rests its conclusion only on proximate cause and declines to follow the
winding trail of remote and multiple causations."87 Unfair results, which
rarely occur under the "primary purpose" test, may occur more often under
the "origin of the claim" test.
In terms of future guidelines, Woodward and Hilton clearly hold that
litigation expenses incurred by purchasers in appraising the stock of dissent-
ing minority stockholders are part of the cost of acquisition of that stock.
Whether deduction would be denied to a seller on the grounds that the liti-
82. Id. The Court said such a test encourages "resort to formalisms and arti-
ficial distinctions."
83. See Vermont Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 682, 684(D. Vt. 1969), a similar case in which the government raised just such an argument.
84. Hilton Hotels v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 617 (1968).
85. Comment, Deductibility of Appraisal Litigation Expenses, 70 COLUm. L.
REv. 538, 542 (1970).
86. Id. at 546.
87. Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118, 128 (1952). Hopefully, appellate
courts will do much to keep the test from being severely applied. The "origin of
the claim" test, unlike the "primary purpose" test, is an objective test that presents
an issue of law. Because of this, an appellate court may substitute its judgment
on appeal, rather than be bound under the dearly erroneous rule, as is the case
with a finding of fact.
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gation expenses had their origin in the cost of disposition is another matter.
While the Court doesn't explicitly say, acquisition and disposition costs are
frequently mentioned together in parts of the opinion.88 Stempfel v. United
States was pending before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals when Wood-
ward and Hilton were decided. The court reversed the decision, and re-
marked that "[w]hile we recognize that in the instant case the taxpayers are
sellers of stock rather than purchasers, as is true in the Woodward and Hil-
ton cases, we believe the Supreme Court dearly intended its ruling to apply
to both."' 0 It seems dear that this type of litigation expense will be con-
sidered a capital expenditure regardless of whether the taxpayer claiming
the deduction is the purchaser or seller of the stock.
As for litigation expenses of other types, the courts will use an "ob-
jective standard of deductibility," 90 and look to the origin of the claim in-
volved, rather than the purpose or consequences of the litigation, in de-
termining whether they are deductible. The extent of the rejection of the
"primary purpose" test is not made dear in Woodward and Hilton,9 1 but
it is very unlikely that it will be extended in the future beyond those cases
which squarely involve the question of whether the taxpayer's purpose in the
litigation is to defend or perfect title to property. Its application may be
continued in this dass of cases, but it is certainly not a favored standard
otherwise.
JAMms D. FDGAR
INSURER'S OBLIGATION TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY:
NOT A DEBT SUBJECT TO ATTACHMENT FOR PURPOSES
OF OBTAINING QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION
State ex rel. Gov't Employees Insur. Co. v. Lasky1
Plaintiff Taussig, a resident of Missouri, was injured in Rhode Island
when a parked car that she was entering was struck by another automobile
operated by defendant Slack, a resident of Rhode Island. Plaintiff brought
suit in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County to recover damages. Based on
an affidavit as to defendant's nonresidency, an attachment and summons was
issued commanding the sheriff of Cole County to attach the lands, tene-
ments, goods, moneys, and credits of defendant and to summon as garnishee
the relator, Government Employees Insurance Company (hereinafter
GEICO), a foreign corporation authorized to do business in Missouri.
88. 397 U.S. 572, 577-78 (1970).
89. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
1280, 1282 (6th Cir. 1970), reversing Stempfel v. United States, 23 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 684 (1969).
90. Anchor Coupling Co. v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1282, 1285
(7th Cir. 1970).
91. Id. As this case points out, the "primary purpose" test is a creation of the
lower courts, and the Supreme Court has never directly reviewed it.
1. 454 S.W.2d 942 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970).
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Plaintiff alleged that GEICO's contractual obligation, as defendant's li-
ability insurer, to defend any action brought against Slack and to indemnify
him from any resulting judgment was a "debt" owing to defendant and thus
subject to attachment. Defendant made a special appearance and moved to
vacate the attachment through which the plaintiff was attempting to obtain
quasi in rem jurisdiction over him. The motion was overruled by the re-
spondent, Judge Lasky. Thereafter GEICO filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition in the St. Louis Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction, since GEICO owed its insured no "debt". The court
issued a provisional rule of prohibition. Upon hearing the St. Louis Court
of Appeals made permanent its provisional rule by holding that neither
the obligation to defend nor the obligation to indemnify was a "debt"
subject to attachment, since the obligation to defend was not "absolutely
due as a money demand"'2 and the obligation to indemnify was "contingent
and speculative."3
A brief summary of the use of attachment and garnishment as a means
of obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant is necessary for a better under-
standing of the present case. First, a state has the power, through its tri-
bunals, to subject a nonresident's property situated within its limits to the
payment of the legal demands of its own citizens.4 By the process of attach-
ment or garnishment 5 courts may obtain in rem6 or quasi in rem7 jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant whose property is in the state so long as
there has been effective seizure of the property and adequate notice to the
2. Id. at 950.
3. Id.
4. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877).
5. The garnishment process is employed when the property of the defendant
to be attached is in the hands of a third party who is present within the state. This
property can be an intangible debt or personal property. In an attachment action
the defendant has possession of his property at the time of the attachment. See H.
GOODRIcH &c E. ScoL.s, CONFLICT or LAws § 71 (4th ed. 1964). Since the effect of
both attachment and garnishment is to bring property belonging to the defendant
under the power of the court for purposes of jurisdiction, the words attachment and
garnishment will not be distinguished in this note.
6. When a thing is subject to the judicial jurisdiction of a state, an action
may be brought to affect the interest in the thing of all persons in the world. Such
a proceeding is commonly referred to as a proceeding in rem. RSATEmENT or
JUDGMENTS, Explanatory Notes § 32, comment a at 127 (1942).
7. If the purpose of the action is to affect the interests in the thing of par-
ticular persons only, the action is commonly referred to as quasi in rem. Proceedings
quasi in rem are of two types, in both of which the jurisdiction of the state is to
affect interests of particular persons in the thing. In the first type the plaintiff as-
serts an interest in a thing and seeks to have his interest established against the
claims of a designated person or persons, e.g., an action to quiet title or remove a
cloud of title to land. In the second type of proceeding, quasi in rem, the one with
which this note is concerned, the plaintiff is not seeking to establish his interest in
the thing but seeks instead to enforce a personal claim against a defendant and by
employing the process of attachment and garnishment seeks to apply the thing to
the satisfaction of his claim. An example of this type proceeding is an action in tort
to recover damages with the action being initiated by attachment or garnishment
where the state has no jurisdiction over defendant but does have jurisdiction over
the thing belonging to defendant or of a person indebted to or under a duty to the
defendant. See RESTATE11ENT (SECOND) CoNLI-r or LAws, IN-RoD. NoTE To CiAF.
3 (soPosED OFFIcIAL DRArr, 1967).
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non-resident.8 The court thereby acquires jurisdiction to render judgment to
the extent of the value of the property so attached9 but cannot render a de-
ficiency judgment against the nonresident defendant.' 0 Thus any judgment
awarded to the plaintiff in an in rem or quasi in rem proceeding must be
satisfied, if at all, from the attached property."
Secondly, attachment and garnishment exist only by virtue of statute12
and can be resorted to only in accordance with the express authorization of
the statute.'8 Missouri allows a plaintiff in any civil action to have an attach-
ment against the property of the defendant where the defendant is not a
resident of the state.14 If that property is a "debt" owed to the nonresident,
garnishment in aid of attachment is authorized.' 5 When notice of garnish-
ment is served on the garnishee (debtor), it has the effect of attaching all
property in his possession belonging to his creditor, the defendant.' 6
To be subject to attachment in Missouri, a debt must be an uncondi-
tional obligation independent of any contingency.' 7 In addition, it must
be absolutely due as a money demand.' 8 Thus, an obligation payable in
services rather than in money cannot be attached.19 Underlying this re-
quirement that a debt be certain and absolutely due as a money demand is
the desire "to avoid multiplicity of lawsuits which would result from unen-
forceable judgments based on attachment of speculative debts." 2 0
Since location or situs of the property is important in ascertaining
8. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 227 (1905); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
722-23 (1878).
9. See Note, Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 78 HARv. L.
Rrv. 909, 948-49 (1960).
10. Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 190 (1886).
11. See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICr op LA-WS 99 (1962).
12. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905).
13. 6 Am. JUR.2d Attachment and Garnishment § 9 (1963).
14. § 521.010 (1), RSMo 1969; Mo. R. Civ. P. 85.01 (1).
15. § 525.010, RSMo 1969 provides:
All persons shall be subject to garnishment, on attachment or execution,
who are named as garnishees in the writ, or have in their possession goods,
moneys or effects of the defendant not actually seized by the officer, and all
debtors of the defendant, and such others as the plaintiff or his attorney
shall direct to be summoned as garnishees.
16. § 525.040, RSMo 1969 provides in part:
Notice of garnishment, served as provided [in these rules shall] have the
effect of attaching all personal property, money, rights, credits, bonds, bills,
notes, drafts, checks or other choses in action of the defendant in the gar-
nishee's possession or charge, or under his control at the time of the service
of the garnishment, or which may come into his possession or charge, or
under his control, or be owing by him, between that time and the time of
filing his answer...
17. Holker v. Hennessy, 143 Mo. 80, 44 S.W. 794 (1898); Hearne v. Keath, 63
Mo. 84 (1876); Raithel v. Hamilton-Schmidt Surgical Co., 48 S.W.2d 79 (St.L. Mo.
App. 1932); Potter v. Conqueror Trust Co., 170 Mo. App. 108, 155 S.W. 80 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1913); Beckham v. Tottle, Hanna & Co., 19 Mo. App. 596 (K.C. Ct. App.
1885).
18. Scales v. Southern Hotel Co., 87 Mo. 520 (1866); Heege v. Fruin, 18 Mo.
App. 139 (St.L. Ct. App. 1885).
19. Weil v. C. H. Tyler & Co., 38 Mo. 545 (1866).
20. See Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U. L.
Rav. 1075, 1078 (1968); 51 MINN. L. REv. 158, 161 (1966).
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whether it comes within the jurisdiction of the court, difficulties frequently
arise when the property is an intangible such as a debt owed to the defend-
ant.21 The Missouri Supreme Court has taken the position,22 which is in
accord with the position taken by the United States Supreme Court in
Harris v. Balk,23 that a debt travels with the debtor and garnishment is
allowed whenever the garnishee (debtor) is personally served in any forum
in which his creditor, the defendant, could bring an action on the debt. If
the garnishee is an insurance company doing business in the state, garnish-
ment may be obtained by serving notice on the State Superintendent of the
Insurance Department.2 4
In the instant case the St. Louis Court of Appeals, after examining the
insurer's contractual obligation to defend and indemnify in the light of
these well-established principles, correctly concluded that such an obligation
was not a "debt" subject to attachment, since the obligation to defend was
"dearly not an indebtedness absolutely due as a money demand."25 The
court questioned, "[i]n and of itself what monetary valuation could be
placed on it?"26 Furthermore, the obligation of GEICO to indemnify de-
fendant up to the limits of the liability policy was only a contingent obliga-
tion which would mature only if and when plaintiff obtained a valid judg-
ment against the defendant insured. As the court stated, "[i]t would be
difficult to imagine a so-called indebtedness more contingent and specula-
tive than an action for personal injuries resulting from the alleged negli-
gence of a defendant."27
Neither the Missouri Supreme Court nor the Kansas City or Spring-
field Courts of Appeal have been faced with the issue of determining
whether an insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify is a debt subject
to attachment in this state. In the absence of a reexamination of this issue
by the Missouri Supreme Court, State ex rel. Government Employees In-
surance Co. v. Lasky2s (hereinafter GEICO) indicates such an obligation is
not an attachable debt in Missouri so as to enable a resident plaintiff to
obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant with respect
to an accident which occurred in another state. Thus, in light of the fact
that personal jurisdiction over defendant was previously lacking both under
Missouri's "long-arm" statute2 9 and Non-Resident Motorist Statute,3 0 this
inability to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction by attachment of the insurer's
obligation will apparently leave plaintiff with the alternative of proceed-
ing against the nonresident defendant in a distant forum.
To support his contention that GEICO's contractual obligation was a
21. See Note, Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAxv. L.
REv. 909, 950-52 (1960).
22. Wyeth Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. H. F. Lang & Co., 127 Mo. 242, 29 S.W.
1010 (1895).
23. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
24. § 525.050, RSMo 1969; Mo. R. Civ. P. 90.04.
25. 454 S.W.2d at 950.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 454 S.W.2d 942 (St.L. Mo. App. 1970).
29. § 506.500, RSMo 1969.
30. § 506.210, RSMo 1969.
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debt subject to attachment in Missouri, respondent relied on two New
York cases holding such an obligation to be attachable.31 In Seider v. Roth32
New York became the only state to allow attachment of the obligation to
defend and indemnify so as to enable a plaintiff to obtain quasi in rem
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. In order to find an attachable
non-contingent obligation to defend under New York's attachment statute,33
the New York Court of Appeals determined that the obligation was inde-
feasibly fixed the moment the accident occurred, since the insurance com-
pany, under the provisions of the policy, had a duty to investigate and pay
medical claims.3 4 The obligation to indemnify, however, was dependent on
proof of negligence. Nevertheless, the court of appeals allowed attachment
of the obligation to indemnify, since the moment negligence was proven
against the defendant (insured), the obligation then became fixed and
therefore was no longer speculative.35 A strong dissent in Seider pointed out
that the obligation to defend and indemnify was contingent and thus not
attachable.3 6 Seider was reaffirmed by the same court a year later in Simp-
31. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1967); Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
32. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). The court of ap-
peals based this decision on the prior case of In re Riggle's Estate, 11 N.Y.2d 73,
181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962) where attachment of the insurer's obliga-
tion to defend and contingently indemnify was allowed. The distinction which the
court failed to mention in its majority opinion was that whereas in Riggle the
defendant had, prior to the attachment of his insurer's obligation, been personally
served and in personam jurisdiction had been obtained (thus causing the obligation
to defend to accrue and a "debt" within the meaning of the statute to materialize),
in Seider in personam jurisdiction was lacking.
33. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 5201 (a), 6202 (McKinney 1963) authorized gar-
nishment of a debt which was "past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or
upon demand" of the creditor. It is important to note that New York (by statute)
and Missouri (by decisions construing section 525.010, RSMo 1969) each require,
for a debt to be subject to attachment, that it be certain and not contingent. If it
is not yet due it can be attached if it is certain to become due. Whereas New York
would allow a debt in the nature of services to be attached so long as it gives promise
of being translatable into an economically valuable tangible such as cash, Missouri
requires that the debt be absolutely due as a money demand.
34. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 113, 216 N.E.2d 312, 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99,
101 (1966). It is interesting to note that this obligation of the insurer to investigate
and pay medical claims was not the same obligation which the appellant was con-
tending to be the "debt". Apparently the court of appeals seized upon this provision
in the liability insurance policy to sustain the contention that the obligation to
defend was no longer contingent and thus attachable.
35. See 51 MnN. L. REv. 158, 161 (1966).
36. See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 116, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d
99, 103 (1966) (Burke, J., dissenting):
The so-called 'debt' which is supposed to be subject to attachment is a mere
promise made to the nonresident insured by the foreign insurance carrier
to defend and indemnify [the insured] if a suit is commenced and if dam-
ages are awarded against the insured. Such a promise is contingent in
nature. It is exactly this type of contingent undertaking which does not fall
within the definition of attachable debt contained in CPLR 5201 (subd.
[a]), i.e., one which 'is past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or
upon demand of the judgment debtor.' The bare undertaking to defend
and indemnify is not an obligation 'past due' and it is not certain to be-
come due until jurisdiction over the insured is properly obtained.
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son v. Loehmann.37 It is important to note that of the states, in addition to
Missouri and New York, which have been faced with the issue of determin-
ing if the contractual obligation of an insurer to defend and indemnify is a
debt subject to attachment under their statutes, every state except New York
has reached a result similar to that in GEICO.38 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina in Howard v. Allen s9 took occasion to reject the
Seider decision. In considering the strength of the New York cases as prec-
edent, the St. Louis Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the deter-
mination of whether such an obligation is a debt subject to attachment in
this state "must be determined in the light of our statutes and our decisions
construing them and applying them, not those of some other state." 40 The
court in GEICO noted that several authors had criticized the Seider de-
cision.41 In Missouri there are three important objections to, Seider.
First, such a decision would have the effect of creating a judicial direct
action,42 a result not justified either by judicial precedent 48 or by legisla-
tion.44
37. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
38. Howard v. Allen, - S.C. -, 176 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1970): "Both the
obligation to indemnify and the obligation to defend are inchoate, conditional,
contingent obligations to the insured.... There is no obligation to defend until
an action is brought and no obligation to indemnify until a judgment against the
insured is obtained."); De Rentiis v. Lewis, - R.I. -, 258 A.2d 464, 467 (1969):
("[obligation to defend and indemnify] not attachable property within the legis-
lative intendment.'); Housley v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967):
(obligation to defend and indemnify contingent upon plaintiff obtaining a judg-
ment against defendant and thus not attachable).
39. - S.C. -, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970).
40. State ex rel. Gov't Employees Insur. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942, 949-50
(St.L. Mo. App. 1970).
41. Id. at 947-48.
42. See 16 BuFF. L. REv. 769, 773 (1967) where the author points out that such
a result would follow if attachment of this obligation is allowed. Although the
defendant (insured) can default and lose the value of the attached obligation, it
will be in the interest of the insurer to defend in each case in the hopes of minimiz-
ing damages.
43. In Noe v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 406 S.W.2d 666 (Mo.
1966) the Missouri Supreme Court refused to allow a direct action to be maintained
where a Missouri resident was injured in Louisiana due to the negligence of the
insured whose policy of insurance was issued by defendant insurance company
which was doing business in Louisiana. Although plaintiff could have maintained
the action in Louisiana under its direct action statute, the court held that the
Louisiana direct action statute was procedural in nature and did not create a sepa-
rate and distinct cause of action enforceable in the courts of Missouri. This decision
tends to illustrate a reluctance on the part of the court to create direct actions in
this state.
44. A legislative disapproval of direct actions can be implied from § 379.200,
RSMo 1969 which provides that if a final judgment is not satisfied within thirty
days from the date of the judgment, then the judgment creditor is permitted to
proceed against the insured and his insurer to reach and apply the insurance money
to the satisfaction of his judgment. Thus, it would be difficult to justify a result
that would in effect allow a plaintiff to maintain a direct action before judgment
without the leadership of the legislature. See 16 Bur. L. REv. 769, 774-75 (1967)
where the author points out that the Seider decision allows a direct action in New
York where strong legislative disapproval can be implied from the New York law.
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Second, such a holding would create another problem centering around
the relationship between the insurer and the insured under the terms of
the liability policy. Under Missouri law 45 if the defendant (insured) made
an appearance to defend on the merits he would subject himself to personal
jurisdiction and a possible judgment in excess of the value of the attached
obligation of his insurer to defend and indemnify. On the other hand, if
the defendant does not appear in the action but defaults instead, he could
be guilty of violating the policy's cooperation clause and could face the loss
of future protection by his liability insurer if plaintiff subsequently brought
an in personam proceeding against him.4 6 Furthermore, in an action where
the defendant faced potential liability in excess of the policy limits, he
would not knowingly submit himself to personal jurisdiction or permit
his insured to enter an appearance on his behalf which would have the
same effect.47 In such an instance the insurer could lose its property without
ever being allowed to defend the action on the merits and without the
plaintiff ever having demonstrated liability on the part of the defendant
(insured). Such a procedure has been held to be unconstitutional as a vio-
lation of due process in that it amounts to a taking which does not comport
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."48 In effect,
such a procedure amounts to a direct action without sufficient procedural
safeguards.4 9
Finally, if Missouri were to permit such an obligation to be attached,
the court would be violating the established rule that an attaching
garnishor (the plaintiff) acquires only such rights against the garnishee as
the garnishee's creditor (the defendant) possessed at the time of attach-
ment.50 No process or proceeding can place the garnishee in a different or
worse position than he would have occupied if sued directly by his cred-
itor.51 This follows from the fact that since plaintiff has not obtained juris-
diction over defendant in proper proceedings, then the garnishee's obliga-
tion to defend has not arisen. Therefore, the garnishee's creditor (the
defendant) has no rights at that time against him on the obligation. By
allowing attachment, the court would be putting the garnishee in a position
quite different from that occupied by him if sued by his creditor.
The procedure which allows a plaintiff to obtain quasi in rem juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant by attachment of his insurer's
obligation to defend and indemnify can be characterized as an extension
of a trend among the states to aid their residents in bringing actions against
nonresidents. 52 The enactment of long-arm statutes is evidence of such a
trend.8 It is submitted that any such extension in this situation should be
45. §§ 521.360, .370, RSMo 1969.
46. See Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
47. Id. at 498.
48. Id. at 500.
49. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 992, 999 (1970).
50. Weil v. C. H. Tyler & Co., 38 Mo. 545, 547 (1866).
51. Id.
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made with the leadership of the legislature and not by the courts, 54 although
judicial extension of jurisdiction may be proper in other areas. The St.
Louis Court of Appeals by its holding in GEICO, not only kept in line
with prior Missouri decisions regarding garnishment of debts, but by so
doing left any such extension in this area to the legislature where it right-
fully belongs.
W.iNDELL R. GIDEON
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY: A LINE IS DRAWN
Baldwin v. New York'
Robert Baldwin was arrested August 20, 1968, and charged with
"jostling," a violation of an ordinance apparently enacted by the New York
legislature to combat pickpocketing in New York City. His pretrial motion
for jury trial in New York City Criminal Court was denied pursuant to
section 40 of the New York Criminal Court Act which declares that all
trials in that court shall be without a jury. On the strength of a police
officer's testimony, Baldwin was convicted by summary trial and given the
maximum sentence of one year in the penitentiary. Baldwin's contention
that section 40 was an unconstitutional denial of his sixth amendment
right to jury trial2 was rejected by both the New York Supreme Court and
the New York Court of Appeals.3 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction, on the ground that the possibility of a one-year
sentence is enough in itself to require the opportunity for a jury trial.4
The Court concluded that no offense for which imprisonment of more than
six months is authorized is "petty" for purposes of the right to trial by jury.5
54. In Howard v. Allen, -- S.C.-, 176 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1970) the court states,
after refusing to allow attachment of the obligation to defend and indemnify:
We are not without sympathy for the plight of the plaintiff. Unfortunately
for her, there is no statute whereby she might obtain personal jurisdiction
of the nonresident defendant.... It may very well be that her plight and
that of others similarly situated deserves the serious consideration of the
General Assembly, but this court is, of course, not empowered to legislate.
1. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI, which provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed....
3. The above facts were compiled from Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66-68
& nn.1-2; rev'g sub nom. Hogan v. Rosenberg, 24 N.Y.2d 207, 211-212; 217 N.E.2d
260, 299 N.Y.S.2d 424, 426 (1969).
4. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). The Court found it un-
necessary to consider Baldwin's second argument that the New York City scheme
was violative of the equal protection clause in that defendants charged with the
same offense elsewhere in the state could receive a six-man jury. Id. at 71 & n.17.
5. Id. at 69. Justice White announced the judgment of the Court and de-
livered an opinion in which Justices Marshall and Brennan joined. Justices Black
and Douglas concurred in the decision but read the Constitution as requiring jury
trials for all crimes except those involving miniscule governmental sanctions. Id.
at 74 & n.2.
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The striking down of the New York procedure and the establishment
of the petty-serious demarcation at six months were predictable upshots of
the Court's decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, a landmark case decided only
months before Baldwin's arrest. The Court in Duncan held that the sixth
amendment requirement of a jury trial for a person charged with a "serious"
offense is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.7 The decision created a gray area for state judges.
Cheff v. Schnackenberg,8 Duncan's immediate predecessor in an oft-cited
line of cases on this issue, 9 told the judges that a possible six-month penalty
was within the Court's concept of a petty offense while Duncan told them
a possible two-year penalty was without it.10
Much of what has been written about the Duncan decision-the his-
torical and social factors which shaped the petty-serious distinction in its
relationship with the right to jury trial-could be repeated in a discussion
of the instant case, 1 but Baldwin is significant in its own right. The ac-
ceptance of the maximum penalty test as the only objective criterion for
drawing a line between petty and serious offenses was reaffirmed. 12 Since
the Court first squared off on the issue, 13 other factors considered have been
the sentence actually imposed,14 the nature of the offense, i.e., classification
of the crime as malum in se or malum in prohibitum and the indictability
of the offense at common law.' 5 The Court in Baldwin cited the "near-
6. 891 U.S. 145 (1968). In a case related to Baldwin and decided the same
day, the Court answered another question raised in Duncan by holding that trial
by a six-man jury satisfies the sixth amendment as applied to the states, despite the
federal requirement of twelve jurors. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
7. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
8. 884 U.S. 873, 380 (1966), involving non-compliance with a federal cease-
and-desist order.
9. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 800 U.S. 617 (1987); District of Co-
lumbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904);
Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
10. Duncan v. Louisiana, 891 U.S. 145 (1968). For an example of Duncan
interpreted to mean that each individual court shall decide the right to trial issue
when a penalty of less than two years is involved, see the lower court's opinion in
the instant case, sub nom. Hogan v. Rosenberg, 24 N.Y.2d 207, 213-14, 247 N.E.2d
260, 263, 299 N.Y.S.2d 424, 428 (1969).
11. 82 HAuv. L. Rlv. 95, 148 (1968); 29 LA. L. R.mv. 118 (1968); 69 CoLm. L.
R y. 419 (1969). For opposing versions on the right to jury trial development see
Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. Cm. L. Rv. 245 (1959); Frankfurter
& Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by
Jury, 39 HAnv. L. R~v. 917 (1926).
12. Baldwin v. New York, 899 U.S. 66, 72-78 (1970). The criterion was first
used in District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) in which the
Court determined that an offense with a 90-day authorized penalty was not one
for which the Constitution assured trial by jury.
13. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
14. See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969); Dyke v. Taylor Imple-
ment Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 891 U.S. 194 (1968); Cheff
v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 878 (1966). This factor seems peculiar to Court con-
sidemtions of criminal contempt prosecutions for which no maximum sentence
has been established.
15. E.g., District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930). Although the maxi-
mum penalty for conviction was only $100 and 30 days in jail, the Court said
[Vol. 86
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uniform judgment of the Nation"1 6 and the federal standardIT as sup-
portive of the six-month demarcation line. Yet, despite the seemingly dear
holding, Baldwin raises at least four questions.
First, although the Court has determined that the "maximum penalty
test" is the only "objective criterion," the Court apparently has not fore-
closed the possibility that other factors mentioned above may in future
cases force the offense into the "serious" classification even though the
possible penalty does not exceed six months. Language in justice White's
majority opinions in both Duncan and Baldwin leaves little doubt the
question is still open.' 8 The Court's balancing of deprivation of liberty and
efficient court proceedings' 9 suggests the fulcrum (the petty-serious de-
marcation) might well shift when other factors are added to the liberty side
of the scale. Five judges now on the Court would draw the upper limit
of a petty offense no higher than six months.2 0 Since Justices Black and
Douglas have adhered to a literal interpretation of the sixth amendment
application to "all crimes," 21 three of their associates would have to find
other factors present in a particular case in order to expand the serious
factor below the six-month line.22 The Court's emphasis on objective cri-
teria diminishes the likelihood of such a decision, however.23
A second question not discussed in Baldwin involves the more practical
situation in which the defendant is charged with two or more 'petty" of-
fenses with total possible maximum sentences exceeding six months. For
example, a possible total of 12-months confinement for peace disturbance
and resisting arrest violations by a single defendant should weigh the same
in the Court's balancing as the one-year sentence facing Baldwin. This may
be answered soon since the issue was raised in the Chicago Eight riot-con-
spiracy trial.24
reckless driving is a "serious" offense because such conduct endangers property and
life. Id. at 73. See also Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68 (1904); Callan v.
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555 (1888).
16. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) defines "petty" offenses in the federal system as those
punishable by no more than six months in prison and/or a fine of not more than
SL500. This same upper limit for the state systems was recommended in the Aimmn-
CAN BAR ASS'N PRojEar ON MiNimum STANDARDS FOR CRIIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 20-23 (Approved Draft, 1968).
18. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 n.6 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968).
19. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970).
20. Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, Black, and Douglas.
21. See Note 5 supra.
22. The Court already has determined that a multi-year probation was not
sufficient to deem the charge "serious". Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 151-52
(1969). But additional guidelines also may be necessary when juvenile offenders
face long reformatory terms. See Debacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969), in which
the Court did not have to answer the right to trial issue because the juvenile
hearing was held prior to the Duncan decision which applied prospectively only.
Id. at 30. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
23. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970).
24. Walz, 13 Legal Questions Raised by the Trial of the Chicago 8 Minus 1
Plus 2, 17 PLAYBOY 176 (June, 1970):
[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has said men cannot be convicted of a
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The Court's singling out of New York City as the only jurisdiction
denying a defendant the "... . right to interpose between himself and a
possible prison term of over six months, the common sense judgment of a
jury...,25 raises a third question: Is the Court implying that schemes in
other states fall within the standards of Duncan and Baldwin? At least eight
states do not afford an alleged misdemeanant the right to jury trial until
he appeals and requests a jury for trial de novo26-even though maximum
penalties for misdemeanors in these states range from one to five years. 27
The question, then, is: Does a jury trial during de novo review satisfy the
sixth amendment? The Duncan Court briefly addressed itself to that ques-
tion in a footnote but circumvented answering it.28 Justice Harlan, in a
poignant dissent in Baldwin, answers in the negative, stating that this
procedure has been deemed "incompatible with the sixth amendment for
putting the accused to the burden of two trials if he wishes a jury verdict."2 9
His conclusion is simply a paraphrasing of his grandfather's opinion for
a unanimous Court in Callan v. Wilson,80 which held that a person charged
with a serious federal offense must be accorded a jury trial at the first
instance. Consequently, the Baldwin Court may have impliedly overruled
Callan. The two-trial system raises an equal protection issue when an indi-
gent defendant is involved since it is not atypical for a state to require some
form of security before appeal is effected.31 The waiving of a security bond
upon determination of indigency seems to fall within the rationale of
Griffin v. Illinois.32 North Carolina, which denies a jury trial until de novo
review in superior court,33 statutorily allows indigents to appeal without
security.34 But a 1969 case in that jurisdiction, State v. Sherron,3 5 points
out other incidents of such a scheme which may be violative of the equal
protection clause. Defendant Sherron spent an unspecified number of days
"serious contempt" ... except by jury. It is arguable that Judge [Julius]
Hoffman's attempted circumvention of this dictate by issuing a stream
of "petty" citations and by sentencing to six months or less on each is
an unavailing gambit.
25. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970).
26. Arkansas, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, and Virginia.
27. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 13942 (1970).
28. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 n.30. (1968). The Court simply
said that past interpretations of the sixth amendment are always subject to
reconsideration.
29. Williams v. Florida, 899 U.S. 78, 137 (1970), in which Justice Harlan's
dissent in Baldwin and concurrence in Williams appears.
80. 127 U.S. 540, 557 (1888). But is Callan precedent for the state courts as
part and parcel of the Duncan decision? This highlights one of the problems in-
herent in the selective incorporation process, as discussed in Young, Review of
Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 16 A.B.A.J. 994 (1970).
31. E.g., Aim. STAT. ANN. § 44-508 (1969).
32. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
"Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship to a
defendant's guilt or innocence and could not be used as an excuse to deprive a
defendant of a fair trial." Id. at 17-18.
33. N.C. Gm_. STAT. § 7A-196 (b) (1969).
34. N.C. Gm,. STAT. § 15-181 (1969).
35. 4 N.C. App. 386, 166 S.E.2d 836 (1969).
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in jail awaiting appeal of a district court conviction and four-month sen-
tence because he could not post a personal appearance bond. On a jury
verdict of guilty, the superior court increased the sentence to 21-24 months
and disallowed credit for the days he already had spent in jail. Sherron's
price for a jury trial was indeed a costly one and certainly would cause
future defendants to consider these risks before appealing to obtain a jury
trial.
A recent case before the Missouri Supreme Court, State ex rel. Wholey
v. Provyn,3 6 sought an answer to a fourth question raised by Baldwin, that
of prospective or retroactive application. The Wholey case arose in the
Kansas City court system, which felt the impact of Baldwin within weeks
after the decision when eight persons successfully relied on Baldwin to
overturn disorderly conduct convictions.T The ruling forced the city, which
by ordinance prohibited jury trials in municipal court,38 to revise its gen-
eral penalty ordinance, reducing the maximum sentence from one year to
six months.3 9 As a result of the favorable use of Baldwin in Kansas City,
Wholey, an inmate of the Kansas City municipal farm, sought retroactive
application of Baldwin as a basis for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was
denied for failure of the petition to state a claim on which any relief could
be.granted. Since there was no opinion, the denial was an apparent rejection
of retroactive application by the Missouri Supreme Court.
In order to determine whether a new constitutional principle will be
applied retroactively, the United States Supreme Court has established a
three-factor analysis: (a) The extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, (b) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards, and (c) the pur-
pose to be served by the new standards.40 After Duncan, states certainly
could not have relied in good faith on the proposition that a defendant
facing possible imprisonment for more than six months could be refused a
jury trial.41 The Baldwin Court's playing down of the effect of its decision 42
would seem to negate any argument that retroactive application would have
significant effect on the administration of justice. The final factor-the pur-
pose to be served by the new standard-cuts against the argument for retro-
36. No. 56193 (Filed Oct. 20, 1970).
37. Kansas City v. Miller (16th Mo. Jud. Cir., decided July 14, 1970). See also
K.C. Times, July 15, 1970, at 3A, col. 2. The city prosecutor subsequently dropped
charges in about 100 city ordinance cases on appeal. K.C. Star, July 21, 1970, at 3,
col. 4.
38. KANsAs Crry, Mo., REV. ORDINANCEs § 35.300 (1956).
39. Ord. No. 38541, § 1.17 (July 17, 1970), repealing KANsAs Crry, Mo., Rv.
ORDINAN(cS § 1.17 (1956). However, the new general penalty ordinance, which
applies to about 95 per cent of the violations, also contains a provision that each
day's violation constitutes a separate and distinct offense, recalling the discussion
in note 24 supra.
40. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
41. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968). Both Louisiana and New
Jersey reduced the penalty to six months for certain violations in order to skirt
the jury trial requirement. LA. CRIAr. PROC. CODE ANN., Art 779 (Supp. 1969); N.J.
REV. STAT. § 2A:169-4 (Supp. 1969).
42. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 71 (1970).
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activity of the Baldwin "rule." The Court in DeStefano v. Woods 3 limited
Duncan to prospective application, stating that "[values implemented by
the right to jury trial would not be served measurably by requiring retrial
of all persons convicted in the past.. . ."44 The Court gave no further ex-
planation and relied heavily on the other two criteria. Standing alone, as it
would in deciding Baldwin's application, this would seem a shaky basis for
denying a fair trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Regardless,
the problem could be far less significant, and possibly non-existent, by June,
1972 (two years after the Baldwin decision), when the maximum sentences
authorized under Duncan will have expired.
Although these four questions may have to be answered by the United
States Supreme Court before the full effect of Baldwin will be known, its
six-month imprisonment factor, unlike Duncan's two-year test, brings the
constitutional right to jury trial into many municipal courts empowered to
impose penalties in excess of six months without the necessity of a jury.
Practically speaking, most persons appearing before those courts are first-
offense defendants, more concerned with restricting the experience to the
fewest moments and less concerned with a jury trial. But widespread publi-
cation of cases such as the one resulting in the Kansas City ordinance
revision could cause those courts to take a dose look at their procedures.
The Missouri Municipal and Magistrate Judges Association offers a good
example of judges determined to dispel "kangaroo court" and "assembly-
line justice" charges.45 The association conducted an informational survey
of municipal court judges46 just prior to Baldwin, the survey concluding
that there is a general "... confusion as to whether, and in what courts, the
defendant has the right to trial by jury."47 Little is known, however, about
the day-to-day functioning of the Missouri municipal courts, isolated from
the rest of the Missouri court system except for infrequent appeals.4 8 Only
in the municipal and police courts of third and fourth class cities is the right
to jury trial secured by statute.4 9 Charter cities such as Kansas City50 were
left to decide for themselves at what point the right to jury trial attaches.51
43. 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
44. Id. at 633.
45. Lauer, Prolegomenon to Municipal Court Reform in Missouri, 31 Mo. L.
REv. 69 (1966) points out some of the characteristics of the municipal court system
which serve as bases for those charges.
46. MIssouI MUNIcIPAL & MAGISTRATE JuDGs Ass'N, A SuiEy OF Mis-
souRI's MUNICIPAL CoURTS (1970) [hereinafter cited as COURT SURVEY]. The survey,
with a 75 per cent return from Missouri municipal and police court judges, was
conducted in cooperation with the Missouri Bar and the University of Missouri-St.
Louis Extension Division.
47. COURT SuRvEY 31. The right dearly is available to defendants in magis-
trate courts regardless of the possible penalty. § 543.200, RSMo 1969.
48. COURT SuRVEY 4.
49. §§ 98.080, .380, .550, RSMo 1969, respectively.
50. See note 38 supra.
51. The lack of uniformity is evidenced in the COURT SuwY, which revealedthat:
(1) 10 per cent of the responding judges did not complete grade school and
another 24 per cent did not graduate from high school. Id. at 12.
(2) Only a third of the judges require a city attorney's presence at all munici-
pal court sessions and 17 per cent never require his presence. Id. at 14.
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The Missouri Supreme Court, sitting en banc, recently took a step
toward reducing the confusion, and, at the same time, offered its first
official interpretation of Baldwin. The case, State ex rel. Cole v. Nigro,5 2
involved a woman charged with obstructing a police officer in violation of
a Kansas City ordinance, which then carried a maximum possible pen-
alty of twelve months imprisonment. Pursuant to Kansas City's summary-
proceeding ordinance, the municipal court judge denied her written de-
mand for a jury trial. She petitioned for and received an alternative writ
of mandamus from the Missouri Supreme Court on May 11, 1970. A month
later Baldwin was decided and, as previously discussed, Kansas City reduced
its general penalty provision to a maximum of six months. In quashing the
alternative writ in Cole the court held that the new penalty ordinance is
applicable to relator's pending case even though enacted after the date of
the alleged offense;5 3 therefore, the six-month rule of Baldwin was satisfied.
The court could have ceased discussion here, the case dispensed with in one
paragraph. Instead, the court quoted at length from a handful of Missouri
cases standing for two propositions in regard to prosecutions for municipal
ordinance violations: (1) That the proceeding is civil in nature but quasi-
criminal in procedure, and (2) that the right to a jury trial is embraced
by neither common law nor the Missouri Constitution, which states that
the "right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate .... ,,54
The court then advised:
Baldwin requires, however, that the Missouri rule be modified to
provide that in municipal court prosecutions where the maximum
period of imprisonment exceeds six months a jury trial must be
provided upon demand.55
(3) 50 per cent of the judges hear less than 100 cases annually and 6 per
cent hear more than 3,000. Id. at 21.
(4) More than half of the courts may be entering void judgments because
of the failure of city attorneys to sign traffic tickets filed against defendants. Id.
at 25.
(5) Some municipal courts prosecute state statute offenders who are guilty of
no municipal violation. Id. at 30.
(6) Ten years after the publication of Rules of Practice and Procedure for
Municipal and Traffic Courts by the Missouri Supreme Court, barely more than
half of the court judges have a copy of the rules and follow them. Id. at 23.
Few municipal courts provide each defendant with a pamphlet such as "Your
Bill of Rights When Appearing Before the Municipal Court of the City of Colum-
bia." This may be one reason less than one-sixth of the courts surveyed in the
CouRT SuRvEY have held a jury trial in the past two years. Neither Kansas City nor
St. Louis municipal courts reported a single jury trial in that period. Although St.
Louis city law authorizes a jury trial, in practice a defendant who requests a jury
trial apparently must wait until he appeals de novo to the St. Louis Court of
Criminal Corrections, which must grant the request for jury trial. St. Louis v.
Moore, 288 S.W.2d 383 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956).
52. - S.W.2d - (Mo. En Banc 1971).
53. Id. at -.
54. Id. at -. See Mo. CoNsr. art. I, § 22 (a).
55. State ex rel. Cole v. Nigro, - S.W.2d -, - (Mo. En Banc 1971). What
if the relator in this case also had been charged with peace disturbance arising out
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Relying solely on the six-month penalty test, the court gave no weight to
relator's argument that she was entitled to a jury trial because the offense
was indictable at common law.56 Based on this advice, cities and towns in
Missouri with authorized penalties in excess of six months might well follow
Kansas City's example and redraw the maximum line at six months. If
penalties were not reduced, a defendant could be charged with an ordinance
violation which would be serious enough to raise the right to jury trial, yet
still be a civil violation in nature-not a crime. The resulting anomoly in
such a dual-natured proceeding is revealed in numerous cases, which show
that a unanimous verdict is required, 57 the defendant must be found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt,58 the judge cannot direct a verdict,59 a defend-
ant's appeal is governed by the criminal code,60 and liability for the "debt"
abates at the death of the convicted person.61 On the other hand, the city
has the right to appeal an adverse decision,6 2 information or complaint re-
quirements are eased, 3 convicted defendants who are unable to pay must
work out the fine or sentence at a prescribed daily wage,64 and the governor
cannot pardon a person convicted of an ordinance violation.65 The "civii"
characterization has been called a "fiction and a facade"6 6 for truly criminal
enactments. By cloaking an offense in the less onerous label of "civil" the
Missouri courts, and others accepting the doctrine, have perpetuated the
inadequate proceedings revealed in the court survey.67
By reaffirming this state's long-standing view on the nature of a
municipal court proceeding and by limiting Baldwin strictly to its hold-
ing,68 the court in Cole seemed to be making its position clear, i.e., against
56. Id. at -. See note 15 supra.
57. King City v. Duncan, 238 Mo. 513, 142 S.W. 246 (1911).
58. Grant City v. Simmons, 167 Mo. App. 183, 151 S.W. 187 (K.C. Ct. App.
1912).
59. See State ex rel. Schonhorst v. Cline, 85 Mo. App. 628 (St.L. Ct. App.
1900).
60. Kansas City v. Martin, 369 S.W.2d 602 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963); § 98.020,
RSMo 1969.
61. City of Clayton v. Sigoloff, 452 S.W.2d 315 (St.L. Mo. App. 1970).
62. City of Clayton v. Nemours, 237 Mo. App. 167, 164 S.W.2d 935 (St.L. Ct.
App. 1942).
63. See Kansas City v. Stricklin, 428 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
64. § 98.020, RSMo 1969. See also Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395 (1881).
The Supreme Court has held that the equal protection clause prohibits the jailing
of indigents convicted of an ordinance violation for which a fine is the only punish-
ment. Tate v. Short, - U.S. -, 91 S.Ct. 668 (1971).
65. See State ex rel. Kansas City v. Renick, 157 Mo. 292, 57 S.W. 713 (En Banc
1900). For a detailed discussion of these anomolies, see also Lauer, Prolegomenon
to Municipal Court Reform in Missouri, 31 Mo. L. REV. 69 (1966).
66. Interview with Roger D. Hines, Columbia (Mo.) municipal judge and
president of the Missouri Municipal Judges Association, Oct. 1, 1970. See 47 MiNN.
L. REv. 93 (1962).
Although verbally clinging to the "civil" label, the St. Louis Court of Appeals
recently stated, "A conviction for violating an ordinance is practically identical with
a conviction for a crime." City of Clayton v. Sigoloff, 452 S.W.2d 315, 316 (St.L.
Mo. App. 1970).
67. See Foreword, COURT SURVEY 10-11 (1970): "[I]t is the system which pro-
duces courts like these that is to blame, not the judges ......
68. Apparently taking a broader view of Baldwin, Judges Donnelly and Seiler
dissented, stating that the Missouri Constitution required that relator be entitled
[Vol. 36
54
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [1971], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss2/6
RECENT CASES
the argument that a defendant should have the same rights in the lowest
city court as he would have in the highest federal trial court-a proposition
which, according to some, is the ultimate result of the line of reasoning
advanced in Baldwin and its predecessors. 69 Theoretically, an affirmative
answer is indicated on the issue of whether a jury trial should be available
in all criminal (or quasi-criminal) prosecutions regardless of the possible
penalty for the offense. On the other hand, practical considerations, e.g.,
crowded court dockets, have demanded a contrary conclusion. In the absence
of sufficient empirical evidence minimizing those practical considerations,70
Baldwin strikes a conscionable and workable medium.
RONALD R. MCMILLIN
RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALLS: AN END
TO CONFUSION IN MISSOURI?
State v. Steele1
The victim was a 19-years-old, unmarried, pregnant, college student.
After discussing her problem with a friend, Cindy, she received a phone call
from a man who said he was Cindy's friend. She received a second phone
call from a man who identified himself as "Doc." They discussed plans for
an abortion. On May 17, the girl received another call from a man identi-
fying himself as "Doc." She told him she wanted an abortion and that she
could have the required $250 by the weekend. She also told the caller
she would be at her rommate's house in Kirkwood, Missouri, and gave him
the phone number. On May 19, the girl received two phone calls from
"Doc' at the Kirkwood residence. During the second call, "Doc" directed
her to take a cab to the intersection of Highway 40 and Lindberg Blvd. The
girl followed these instructions and was met by a man (not defendant) to
whom she gave the money. He directed her to a motel room where another
man she later identified as the defendant performed an abortion. Evidence
at trial tended to show that the defendant was a graduate of chiropractic
to a jury trial because the charge exposed her to deprivation of her liberty and
because the offense involved also was embraced by the state criminal code. State ex
rel. Cole v. Nigro, - S.W.2d -, - (Mo. En Banc 1971).
69. See COURT SURvEY 32 (1970).
70. The majority opinion in Baldwin makes little use of statistics in discussing
the possible administrative burden an expanded right to jury trial might present.
See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 74 n.22 (1970). The dissenting opinions of
Chief Justice Burger, id. at 74, and Justice Harlan, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
135 (1970), include the argument that the peculiarities of a particular locality de-
mand different petty-serious demarcations and Justice Harlan cites awesome statis-
tics about the volume of judicial business in the New York City courts.
For a discussion of the added burden in Minneapolis municipal courts whenjury trial was extended to intoxicated driving cases, see 47 MINN. L. Rzv. 93 (1962).
T Columbia, Missouri, municipal court, which grants a jury trial upon request
regardless of the offense, averages only one jury trial per month, according to
Judge Roger D. Hines. See note 66 supra.
1. 445 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1969).
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school and was called "Doc" by some people. Evidence of the phone con-
versations was objected to at trial as hearsay, but this objection was
overruled. Defendant appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court.
The issue on appeal was whether there was sufficient identification of
the caller to allow the admission of the evidence. If the identification was
sufficient to establish the caller as defendant, the evidence would come in
under the "admissions exception" to the hearsay rule.2 Conversely, if the
identification was not sufficient the evidence would be inadmissible. The
supreme court ruled that identification could be established by circum-
stances and that the circumstances in this case were sufficient to establish
that the call was, in fact made by defendant.
The general rule is that testimony about a telephone conversation is
not admissible absent identification of the caller.3 However, an exception is
made when the testifying witness dials a given phone number. The person
answering is presumed to be the person called if the number was obtained
from a phone book or the person himself.4 Further, if a cental switchboard
places the caller in contact with another at the caller's request, the pre-
sumption is that the person reached is the person requested. 5
This presumption is not raised when the witness is the party receiving
the call.8 If the party receiving the call recognizes the voice of the caller the
evidence will be admitted,7 but this is not the ouly means of identifying
the caller. In General Securities Co. v. Sunday School Publishing Board, Inc.,8
the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that identification of the caller could
be made by circumstance. That case involved a suit on a promissory note in
which a witness testified that he was called by a Mr. Wood, who inquired
as to the validity of several notes. The Tennessee court held that since Mr.
Wood was the only one handling this type of business for plaintiff, the
circumstances were sufficient to identify Mr. Wood as the caller. Similarly,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina held in State v. Strickland9 that an
anonymous call instructing the prosecuting witness to look under his door
mat for an extortion letter was admissible when, after the witness did in
fact find the letter and followed the instruction to leave money in a flower
pot, the defendant was apprehended while attempting to pick up the money.
2. McCommxcn, EvmcCE § 239 (1954). In situations when the caller is not a
party, the identification of that caller could not of itself be enough to overcome a
hearsay objection. In that case another exception to the hearsay rule must be found.
This note will consider only the identification of the caller.
3. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 188 (1964); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Silverstein,
53 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1931).
4. Shelton v. Wolf Cheese Co., 358 Mo. 1129, 98 S.W.2d 947 (1936);
Wolfe v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 97 Mo. 473, 11 S.W. 49 (1888).
5. Guest v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R1, 77 Mo. App. 258 (K.C. Ct. App.1898).6. Powers v. Commercial Serv. 202 N.C. 13, 161 S.E. 689 (1931); Meyer Mill-
ing Co. v. Strohfeld, 224 Mo. App. 508, 20 S.W.2d 963 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929).
7. State v. Berezuk, 331 Mo. 626, 55 S.W.2d 949 (1932); Williamson-Halsell-
Fraiser Co. v. King, 58 Okla. 120, 158 P. 1142 (1916).
8. 22 Tenn. App. 590, 125 S.W.2d 160 (1939).
9. 229 N.C. 201, 49 S.E.2d 469 (1948); accord, Texas Candy & Nut Co. v.
Horton, 235 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
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In State v. Kladis'0 a policeman received a call from a woman who identified
herself as Mrs. Kladis and reported someone breaking into her house.
Several minutes later the woman called again to tell the officer to "cancel'
the first call because the housebreaker was her husband. The Kansas
Supreme Court, in affirming the husband's conviction of burglary of a
grocery store, held that the calls were consistent with the overall scheme
developed in the prosecution's case; the defendant was surprised while
burglarizing a grocery store and fled, leaving his car and housekeys at the
scene requiring him to break into his own house. This theory was supported
by other evidence of defendant's guilt, but no direct evidence of the identity
of the caller was produced, except the fact that the caller identified herself
as Mrs. Kladis. Thus, the only circumstances tending to show who called
were described in the prosecution's opening statement and not by witnesses.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals has held in Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Preston". that the caller is also sufficiently identified if he reveals special
knowledge that only he would know.12 In Liberty Mutual the witness
received a call from a man identifying himself as Mr. Preston, who stated
that he was having trouble with his car, a 1956 Oldsmobile, in a state park.
When the evidence tended to show that Mr. Preston was driving a 1956
Oldsmobile and was in the vicinity of the park, the phone call was held
admissible.
The test which summarizes these exceptions to the general hearsay rule
was set out by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Carbo v. United States:
The issue for the trial judge in determining whether the required
foundation for the introduction of... [the phone call] has been
established is whether the proof is such that the jury, acting as
reasonable men, could find its authorship as claimed by pro-
ponent' s
The Missouri law prior to Steele was confusing because the St. Louis
Court of Appeals and the Springfield Court of Appeals held oppositely on
the matter of received phone calls, while the positions of the Kansas City
Court of Appeals and the Missouri Supreme Court were uncertain. The first
Missouri case involving a phone call received by a testifying witness, a Kan-
sas City Court of Appeals case was Kansas City Star Publishing Co. v. Stand-
ard Warehouse Co.14 Plaintiff received a telephone inquiry about an adver-
tisement placed in plaintiff's newspaper. The caller identified himself as the
president of defendant company. It is not dear from the opinion which party
offered the evidence, but since the court of appeals stated that the only
issue was the authority of the person placing the ad to bind the defendant,
and since the fact that the evidence was offered to show the president knew
10. 172 Kan. 38, 238 P.2d 522 (1951).
11. 399 S.W.2d 367 (rex. Civ. App. 1966).
12. Id. See also Gutowsky v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 287 P.2d
204 (Okla. 1955) where caller referred to details of a drilling operation then in
progress; Commonwealth v. Du Hadway, 175 Pa. Super. 201, 103 A.2d 489 (1954)
where caller tried to place a bet with raiding officer who answered defendant's
phone).
13. 314 F.2d 718, 743 (9th Cir. 1963).
14. 123 Mo. App. 13, 99 S.W. 765 (K.C. Ct. App. 1907).
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of the ad, it seems that it must have been offered by plaintiff, not the
party who placed the call. The Kansas City Court of Appeals admitted the
evidence, replying on Wolfe v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co.15 and Guest v.
Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Co.16 In both of these cases the call was
placed by the party offering the conversation thus they are questionable
authority for the Kansas City Star decision. In 1928, the Kansas City Court
of Appeals again decided the question in favor of admissibility in Miller v.
Phenix Fire Ins. Co.17 Although it is not clear from the opinion who
offered the conversation, the court again relied on Wolfe and Guest, this
time citing Kansas City Star in the line of cases with Wolfe and Guest. This
was probably because the Wolfe and Guest cases were cited as authority
albeit incorrectly, in reaching the Kansas City Star decision.
Meanwhile, the Springfield Court of Appeals decided against admission
in Meyer Miling Co. v. Strohfeld.'s The defendant in Meyer offered a
witness's conversation with plaintiff to prove that plaintiff had notice of
a defect in a note. The plaintiff had called the witness, a banker, to
determine the worth of the note. In ruling the evidence inadmissible the
court reviewed many of the Missouri authorities on the question, drawing a
distinction between those cases in which the witness had placed the call, and
those in which the witness had received the call. The call was held to be
admissible in the former line of cases, while inadmissible in the latter.
Unfortunately, the Springfield court placed the Kansas City Star case in the
line of cases in which the witness placed the call, presumably because of the
reliance in Kansas City Star on Wolfe and Guest.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals decided in favor of admission in Morriss
v. Finkelstein,'0 in which the plaintiff's attorney wrote a letter to a Mr.
Levitt and shortly thereafter received a phone call from a man who identified
himself as Mr. Levitt and referred to the attorney's letter. The St. Louis
court in admitting the evidence read the prior cases, especially Kansas City
Star, as standing for the proposition that a call received by the witness is
admissible if the circumstances tend to identify the caller. In 1956, the
St. Louis Court of Appeals held a call received by plaintiff's mother
inadmissible for lack of identifying circumstances.2 0 Thus the St. Louis
court was consistent in holding in favor of admissibility although it did
require a great amount of corroborating identification evidence.
With the St. Louis court favoring admissibility, the Springfield court
squarely against it, and the Kansas City court in doubt, the Missouri
Supreme Court, prior to Steele, seemed to be wavering between the two
15. 97 Mo. 473, 11 S.W. 49 (1888).
16. 77 Mo. App. 258 (K.C. Ct. App. 1898).
17. 9 S.W.2d 672 (K.C. Mo. App. 1928).
18. 224 Mo. App. 508, 20 S.W.2d 968 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929).
19. 145 S.W.2d 439 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940).
20. Herzwurm v. Mound City Cab Co., 290 S.W.2d 203 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956).
The plaintiff was beaten for strike breaking and sued the defendant for fraud. The
call was proportedly made by defendant assuring plaintiff, through his mother,
that the strike was over and it was safe to return to work. The St. Louis court held
that the identification was not established by the above circumstances and that de-
fendant was, therefore, not bound by the statement.
[Vol. 36
58
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [1971], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss2/6
RECENT CASES
positions. On certiorari of Meyer Milling, the supreme court adopted the
Springfield court's reasoning in Meyer Milling.21 The court further evaded
resolving the conflict by declining to hold the decision contrary to a prior
holding of the supreme court, because the court had only cited the
Kansas City Star decision with approval but had not decided the case, and
therefore; it was not a holding of the supreme court. In 1932, the supreme
court again considered the question and stated that circumstances would
be sufficient to identify the caller; however, the supreme court held the
evidence inadmissible because the identification in that case was insuffi-
cient.22 In Teel v. May Dept. Stores,23 the supreme court held a call received
by a Mrs. Foster admissible, stating the circumstances were sufficient to
identify the caller. However, both the plaintiff and the defendant testified
as to the defendant's end of the conversation with Mrs. Foster. It seems likely
that the evidence was admissible to clarify the entire conversation.24
In view of Steele, it now appears that Missouri has definitely adopted
the rule that identification of a caller may be established by circumstances
surrounding the call. The supreme court relied on both the North Carolina
decision, Strickland, and the Kansas decision, Kladis, in reaching its
decision; the only Missouri case mentioned was State v. Berezuk.25 The
remaining question is how far this doctrine will extend. It seems certain
that it will be used in the criminal area, particularly in crimes of ano-
nymity,26 or where the phone conversation is a part of the crime.2 7 The
doctrine has been followed where the call tends to prove that notice
to potential holders in due course was given;28 that a contract was made
in negotiations by telephone; 29 that liability exists;3 0 or if it is to be used
21. State ex rel. Strohfeld v. Cox, 325 Mo. 901, 30 S.W.2d 462 (En Banc 1930).
22. State v. Berezuk, 331 Mo. 626, 55 S.W.2d 949 (1932). The sister of the
prosecutrix in a rape case received a call from defendant and discussed his relation-
ship with prosecutrix. The supreme court held that the information in the con-
versation could have been possessed by others and, therefore, the circumstances
were not sufficient.
23. 352 Mo. 127, 176 S.W.2d 440 (1943).
24. The plaintiff was suing for false imprisonment. She had been held with
her sister-in-law by defendants' store detectives until both confessed to obtaining
property under false pretense. The sister-in-law had charged goods to the account of
a Mr. Foster who had been seeing the sister-in-law. During the confinement, the
detectives called Mrs. Foster to ascertain whether the sister-in-law had authority to
purchase on Mr. Foster's account.
25. 331 Mo. 626, 55 S.W.2d 949 (1932). See note 22 supra.
26. State v. Steele, 445 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Mo. 1969).
The broad statement that the conversation of a person at the other end
is never admissible until he is identified cannot be sustained by authority.
It is particularly inapplicable in prosecution for crimes in which secrecy,
anonymity and concealed identity are always resorted to as means of safe
accomplishment, and proof is largely circumstantial....
27. Carbo v. U.S., 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963); State v. Strickland, 229 N.C.
201, 49 N.E.2d 469 (1948); Commonwealth v. Du Hadway, 175 Pa. Super. 201,
103 A.2d 489 (1954).
28. Meyer Milling Co. v. Strohfeld, 224 Mo. App. 508, 20 S.W.2d 963 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1929); General Securities Co. v. Sunday School Publishing Bd. Inc., 22 Tenn.
App. 590, 125 S.W.2d 160 (1939).
29. Texas Candy & Nut Co. v. Horton, 235 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
30. Miller v. Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 9 S.W.2d 672 (K.C. Mo. App. 1928);
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as evidence of discrimination on the part of landlords.3 1 There is also one
case which indicates that the identification by the caller himself, with no
attendant circumstances shown, would be enough,32 but such a "boot strap"
argument seems, to this author, unlikely to be followed. It appears from
Steele that each case will turn on whether there are circumstances suf-
ficient to identify the caller. How much is necessary is still somewhat
uncertain, but if the call is part of an overall scheme of circumstances it
seems likely that it will be admitted.33
The cases decided by the Missouri courts have had stronger evidence
than the minimum requirement stated in the opinion. One can say that if
the caller mentions something which would not be general knowledge or
the call seems to be a logical step in the sequence of events surrounding
the transaction or crime, it will be admitted. As cases arise in the future
with appropriate facts to test the minimum requirement, more definite
guidelines should emerge.
WARREN D. WEINSTEIN
MORE EMANATIONS FROM RULE 10b-5
Kahan v. Rosenstiel'
In March 1967, Schenley Industries, of which Lewis Rosenstiel was the
controlling shareholder and chairman, was negotiating the possibility of a
merger with P. Lorillard Company. Shortly thereafter, negotiations were
terminated because Lorillard was not willing to give Rosenstiel the premi-
um that he demanded for his interest, and Rosenstiel began negotiations
with Glen Alden Corporation. In March 1968, Rosenstiel sold his control-
ling interest to Glen Alden, of which Meshulam Riklis was the controlling
shareholder, for $80 a share. Concurrent with the sale it was publicly an-
nounced through various financial media that Glen Alden would make a
tender offer to all of the common shareholders of Schenley, which would
be comparable to the $80 per share paid to Rosenstiel. 2
Claiming that Glen Alden's offer was not equivalent to the $80 per
share paid to Rosenstiel for his controlling interest and that other compa-
nies (including Lorillard) had been willing to make an offer that was
generally more favorable to the minority shareholders, the plaintiff filed
Gutowksy v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 287 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1955);
Thruway Service City Inc. v. Townsend, 116 Ga. App. 879, 157 S.E.2d 564 (1967).
31. Robinson v. Branch Brook Manor Apartments, 101 N.J. Super. 117, 248
A.2d 284 (1968).
32. Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank of Barnesville, 106 Ga. App. 794, 128 S.E.2d
344 (1962).
33. State v. Steele, 445 S.W.2d 686, 639 (Mo. 1969) where the court said that
"no hard and fast rule determines the adequacy of the circumstances in all cases."
1. 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 898 U.S. 950 (1970).
2. The proposed offer consisted of cash, debentures, and warrants to purchase
Glen Alden's stock. Id. at 164.
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an actions under section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 19344 and
SEC Rule 10b-55 (Rule 10b-5) seeking damages and "further relief as may
be just."6 Plaintiff's suit was on behalf of all of the common shareholders of
Schenley at the time of the transaction, except Rosenstiel, and named Glen
Alden, Riklis, Schenley and its directors as defendants. Plaintiff alleged
that defendants had (1) misrepresented the true value of the proposed
tender offer, and (2) failed to disclose that Lorillard was willing to make
a more favorable offer. Subsequent to the filing of suit, Glen Alden revised
the tender offer. The plaintiff, still not satisfied, amended his complaint,
and Glen Alden made a final tender offer which the plaintiff acknowledged
was equal to the $80 per share given to Rosenstiel. These revisions were
made without consulting plaintiff. The plaintiff admitted that his underly-
ing cause of action had become moot. However, claiming that he had
created a fund for the benefit of all the members of his class, he filed a
petition to recover attorneys' fees.
In reviewing this petition, the District Court for the District of Dela-
ware noted that in order to recover attorneys' fees, it was necessary for the
plaintiff to show that his original cause of action was of a "meritorious
quality," and that this required a showing that the complaint could have
withstood a motion to dismiss.8 Because plaintiff had (1) failed to allege
that he or the members of his class were purchasers or sellers, (2) failed to
allege reliance on the alleged fraud, and (3) failed to establish a proper
class, the court decided that plaintiff's claim could not have withstood a
motion to dismiss.9 Further, it added that because no fund had actually
3. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 300 F. Supp. 447 (D. Del. 1969).
4. Securities Exchange Act § 10 (b), 15 U.S.C. 78 (j) (1964) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange...(b) To use or employ in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
5. SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artiface to defraud,(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
6. 424 F.2d at 174.
7. If the difference between the initial offer and the final offer is multiplied
by the number of shares held by minority shareholders, the sum is approximately
$83,000,000. Plaintiff requested 10% of this for expenses and attorneys' fees.
8. 300 F. Supp. at 450, citing Levine v. Bradlee, 378 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1967);
Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384 (Del. 1966).
9. 300 F. Supp. at 450-51.
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been created, plaintiff was in reality trying to recover attorneys' fees from
an adverse party, which could not be done. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court to determine whether or not the plaintiff's suit had actually
caused the subsequent offers, and to determine which, if any, of the
defendants would be liable for the attorneys' fees.1 0
In Mutual Shares v. Genesco, Inc. the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit stated, "[I]t is now common ground that an injured investor does
have a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5."11 Fully one-third of the
cases brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 deal with Section
10b and Rule 10b-5.12 Because there has been so much activity in the Rule
10b-5 area since a private civil remedy was first implied,' 3 a brief review of
the setting in which Kahan v. Rosenstiell4 was decided will help in analyz-
ing the court's reasoning.
One of the first developments in the area was a holding in Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp.15 that a plaintiff had to be a "defrauded purchaser or
seller of securities" to have standing to sue under rule 10b-5. This decision
was based upon the court's interpretation of the legislative history of section
10b.16 Because the strict purchaser-seller requirement in Birnbaum has
caused hardships' 7 in actions under Rule 10b-5, the courts have modified it
drastically.' 8 In 1964, it was held that a "defrauded offeree" was not a
seller and did not have standing under Rule 10b-5,19 but in 1967, Moore v.
Greatamerica Corp.2° recognized standing to seek injunctive relief in a
corporation which was not a seller or buyer but whose shareholders had
received a fraudulent tender offer. The District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio explained that it saw a trend to follow a "liberal interpreta-
10. There was language in the court of appeals decision which indicated that
only Glen Alden and Riklis would be responsible for attorneys' fees, but on re-
hearing the court of appeals chose to let the district court make this determination.
424 F.2d at 168, 175. On remand the district court denied a motion by Schenley's
directors to dismiss the petition for attorneys' fees as against them. Kahan v.
Rosenstiel, 315 F. Supp. 1391 (1970).
11. 384 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1967).
12. A. BROAMERG, SzcuarrI=s LAw-FRAuD-SEC RuI.LE lOb-5, 45, § 2.5 (5) (1967).
13. The implied civil action was first recognized in Kardon v. National Gyp-
sum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) and was approved by analogy in J. I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) which was brought under SEC Rule 14a-9,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1970). See 6 L. Loss, SEcusT'Es REGULATIONS 3871 (1969).
14. 424 F.2d 161.
15. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
16. In Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455, 456 (6th Cir. 1970) the court men-
tioned another reason for the sustained vitality of the Birnbaum doctrine, where it
said that without it the doors of "federal jurisdiction in claims for damages against
corporate directors and officers arising out of breach of fiduciary duties" would be
opened. For a rebuttal to this argument see Cohen, The Development of Rule 10b-5,
23 Bus. LAw. 593 (1968).
17. City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 228 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 905 (1970) (dictum).
18. See Annot., 4 A.L.R. Fed. 1048 (1970).
19. Keers & Co. v. American Steel 9- Pump Corp., 234 F.Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
20. 274 F.Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
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tion of the Act in order to eliminate any undesirable practices." 21 This dis-
tinction between suits for equitable relief and suits for damages as related to
standing in the 10b-5 cases in recent development 22 and comes at a time
when the courts are also reworking their definitions of purchasers and sellers.
Now "forced sellers" have standing,23 and a corporation issuing its own
shares is a seller within the meaning of the 1934 Act.24 In 1967, the same
year that the Moore decision was handed down, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, originator of the Birnbaum doctrine, addressed itself to
the equity-damage distinction in Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.2 r
In that case plaintiff was a minority shareholder, and the allegation was
that the defendant had, through fraudulent activities, manipulated and
depressed the market price enabling it to purchase shares at less than their
true value from the minority shareholders. Plaintiffs had not sold their
shares at the time of the suit. The court said that the claim for damages
would have to be dismissed because of lack of standing. However, they went
on to say "we do not regard the fact that plaintiffs have not sold their
stock as controlling on the claim for injunctive relief,"26 and that stock-
holders can play "an important role in the enforcement" of section 10b in
this way.2 7 All of this activity prompted some commentators to suggest that
the Birnbaum doctrine had met its demise.2 8 However, recent cases indicate
that the purchaser-seller requirement, as modified, is still alive.2 9
The purchaser-seller requirement was particularly meddlesome to the
court in Kahan because a tender-offer was involved. Although section 10b
has been in existence since 1934, tender offers were rarely used before
1965.30 Corporate tender offers have become one of the most popular means
of acquiring control of another company. 31 In Crane Co. v. Westinghouse
Air Brake Co.3 2 the court lamented the problem of applying "to the devices,
21. Id. at 492.
22. In Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967) the
court said that plaintiff had to be a buyer or seller to seek injunctive relief.
23. See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
970 (1967). Here the minority stockholder was effectively forced into a sale of his
stock by virtue of his being left with the other alternatives of continued holding of
shares in a non-existent corporation or exchange for shares in the surviving corpora-
tion. See also Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
24. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); Hooper v. Mountain States
Sec. Co., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960).
25. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
26. Id. at 546.
27. Id. at 547.
28. Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Lowenfells,
The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REv.
268 (1968).
29. See Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir. 1968), where the court
said that Birnbaum "is still the rule at least insofar as actions for damages are
concerned." See also Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
30. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
31. Comment, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers Under Federal
Securities Law: A New Challenge for Rule 10b-5, 33 U. CHi. L. Rzv. 359 (1966).
32. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
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new and old, used in these battles [corporate take-overs] the protection
contained in legislation existing at the dates of the action in suit."3 3 In
recognition of this problem, section 14 (e)34 was added to the Securities
Exchange Act in 1968. In Electronic Specialty Go. v. International Controls
Corp.,35 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that section
14 (e) in effect "applies Rule lOb-5 both to the offeror and to the opposition
and it is very likely, except perhaps for any bearing it may have on standing,
only a codification of existing case law."3 6 Section 14 (e) was not applicable
in Kahan because it did not go into effect until July 29, 1968 after the
alleged violation in the case had occurred. It is submitted, however, that
the fact that Congress had deemed it necessary to provide a remedy to the
defrauded tender offeree, although somewhat belatedly, probably motivated
the court in its determination to find standing in this case.
At the same time the debate concerning the standing issue has been
going on, the courts have been trying to make it easier for those plaintiffs
who meet the standing requirement to bring a Rule lOb-5 action. Because
"numerous relatively small investors may be deterred from seeking individ-
ual relief and aggregation of claims may lure better or more extensive legal
services,"3 7 class actions have been held proper under Rule 10b-5.38
Questions have also arisen as to what kinds of relief are available to
plaintiffs. Section 28 (a) of the 1934 Act3 9 provides for recovery of "actual
damages." Punitive damages are generally held to be unavailable in lOb-5
actions, 40 but under certain circumstances attorneys' fees are recoverable. 41
33. Id. at 793.
34. Securities Exchange Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (Supp. IV 1969)
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or re-quest or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in
opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
35. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
36. Id. at 940-41.
37. A. BROMBERG, Scuarrms LAw--FR.u--SEC RuLE lOb-5, 255, § 11.6(1967). A similar statement was made in Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 296 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1968).
38. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977(1968).
39. Securities Exchange Act § 28 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (a) (1964) provides that:[n]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions
of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or
more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account
of the act complained of.
40. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1969); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1968). Contra, de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp.647 (D. Colo. 1969). In this case the court said § 28 (a) applied only to those causes
of action provided for in the Securities Exchange Act itself [15 U.S.C. § 78i (e)(1964) and 15 U.S.C. § 78r (a) (1964)] and did not prevent the awarding of punitive
damages in actions under § 10b and rule lOb-5.
41. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 42 a suit brought "both derivatively on
behalf of Auto-Lite and as representatives of the class of all its minority
shareholders," 43 the Supreme Court decided that section 28 (a) did not pre-
clude the awarding of interim attorneys' fees under section 14 (a) of the 1934
Act.44 Justice Harlan said:
[W]e cannot fairly infer from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
a purpose of circumscribing the courts' power to grant appropriate
remedies. The courts must . . . determine whether the special
circumstances exist that would justify an award of attorneys' fees,
including reasonable expenses of litigation other than statutory
costs.4 5
By analogy, the Court's reasoning should apply to section 10b. The Court
noted that the "fund" or "substantial benefit" case is the primary judge-
created exception to the rule that attorneys' fees will not be awarded in the
absence of a statute or a contract between the pardes.4 6 Normally these are
class actions where a fund was created for or a substantial benefit conferred
upon the members of a class. The Supreme Court explained that the reason
for this rule was the unfairness in allowing the other members of the class
to benefit at the expense of the plaintiff. 47 The Mills opinion also notes
that it is not a literal necessity that a fund be present,48 and states that
attorneys' fees can be awarded against a corporation in shareholders' derivi-
tive actions. By imposing them against the corporation, the court can dis-
tribute the costs equally among the shareholders "regardless of whether an
actual money recovery has been obtained in the corporation's favor."49 The
Court was careful to point out, however, that attorneys' fees were not being
awarded against an adverse party, but were imposed on "the class that has
benefited from them and that would have had to pay them had it brought
the suit."50
It was within this setting that the court of appeals decided that it
would be appropriate to award attorneys' fees in Kahan. The court did
not have much trouble in deciding that it was unnecessary to allege reliance
to have a cause of action under Rule 10b-551 or in deciding that plaintiff
represented a proper class.52 The significance of Kahan rests in the ingenious
42. Id.
43. Id. at 378.
44. Id. at 391.
45. Id. at 391.
46. Id., citing 6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcIncE 54.77 (2) at 1349 (2d ed. 1966).
47. 396 U.S. at 392.
48. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). Here attorney's
fees were given to a plaintiff who brought an action on her own behalf because
her case would have stare decisis effect, enabling other plaintiffs similarly situated
to recover from specific assets of defendant.
49. 396 U.S. at 394.
50. Id. at 397.
51. 424 F.2d at 173-74. The court said that the fact that the misstatement or
omission was required to be "material" by § 10b and the fact that it was hard to
show reliance on the part of a class did away with the requirement of alleging
reliance.
52. 424 F.2d at 168-69.
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application of the relaxed test for standing in suits for equitable relief an-
nounced in Mutual Shares Corp. and in the fact that it goes a step beyond
Mills in allowing recovery of attorneys' fees from adverse parties.
While acknowledging that the underlying suit in this case was for
damages, the court noted that the plaintiff had requested "further relief as
may be just."53 The court reasoned further that since Rule 54 (c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to award "any relief appro-
priate under the circumstances," 54 plaintiff's suit should not have been
dismissed "if a cause of action for injunctive relief were in fact inherent in
the complaint."5 5 Having thus established that the plaintiff was seeking
injunctive relief, the court decided that plaintiff and his class could have
withstood a motion to dismiss and therefore had standing.
Addressing itself to the problem of awarding attorneys' fees from an
adverse party, the court started with the premise that attorneys' fees are
normally not awarded in the absence of a statute or contract authorizing
them.50 Next, the court noted the "fund" or "substantial benefit" exception
that was applied to the section 14 (a) case in Mills. While no fund was
actually created in this case, the plaintiff contended that since defendants
Glen Alden and Riklis had made the subsequent tender offers to the indi-
vidual shareholders without consulting plaintiff, defendants were respon-
sible for the fact that no fund existed. Plaintiff further argued that this
action violated Rule 23 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure57 requir-
ing formal class settlements. In Moore's Federal Practice it is noted that
courts of equity "may award attorney's fees in favor of one party against
another, where ... a defense ... is maintained in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."5 8 Plaintiff contended that defendants'
actions in "brazenly ignoring Rule 28 (e)" 59 put them into this category.
Acknowledging what could be called the "conduct" doctrine,6 0 the court
noted that a substantial benefit had been conferred upon the members of
plaintiff's class and accepted the plaintiffs argument that it was defendants'
fault that no fund was created. Therefore, the court decided that the district
court could, at its discretion, award attorney's fees stating:
If a court ultimately decides that a plaintiff created substantial
benefit for others, it could find it inequitable to deprive plaintiff
53. Id. at 174.
54. Fmn. R. Civ. P. 54 (c) states: "[e]very final judgment shall grant the relief
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has
not demanded such relief in his pleadings."
55. 424 F.2d at 174.
56. Id. at 165.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (e) provides: "A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dis-
missal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as
the court directs."
58. 6 J. MooaR, MooR's FEDEmL PRAcrICE ff54.77 (2) at 1352 (2d ed. 1966).
59. 424 F.2d at 168.
60. See, e.g., Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960),
where defendant had taken the name of plaintiff's corporation. See also Maternally
Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956). ,
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of counsel fees, merely because defendants prevented the physical
creation of the fund by flagrantly ignoring Rule 23.61
This "conduce' argument was unsuccessfully presented in a Rule 10b-5
action in the case of Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine.6 2 There the court
decided that plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees where defendants
had violated 10b-5 by "churning" her account.63 The court mentioned the
"conduct" doctrine but said that the "interest of justice does not require the
awarding of counsel fees" 64 in this case. Kahan is the first case in which the
"'conduct" doctrine has been used as grounds for awarding attorney's fees
from an adverse party, and it is certainly an extension of the mandate to
allow recovery of attorneys' fees set forth in Mills.
The ruling in Kahan supports the proposition that Rule 10b-5 no
longer means what it says. "If civil liability is to remain ... it should be
codified." 65 The court took an implied tort, went out of its way to find a
category in which plaintiff, if he fit, could have standing and then neatly
implied plaintiff right into that category. Such mental gymnastics are cer-
tainly entertaining, but they do not contribute to the stabilization of the
law in the Rule 10b-5 area.
It is hard to say exactly what effect, if any, Kahan will have on future
101>5 litigation. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not ex-
plicitly repudiate the Birnbaum doctrine, but they certainly expressed dis-
favor with it and went out of the way to circumvent it. The case follows the
precedent set forth in Mutual Shares66 by adopting a more liberal standing
test in suits for equitable relief which does not require that plaintiff be a
"purchaser or seller" at all, but only that there is some sort of causal con-
nection between the alleged violation of Rule 10b-5 and the damage suffered
by plaintiff.6 7 If Kahan is followed, it will not be necessary for a plaintiff
to specifically seek injunctive relief in order to have standing if there is an
inherent claim for injunctive relief in the cause of action6 s It does not
appear that Kahan will affect standing in damage suits under Rule 10b-5
unless this inherent claim is present.
Kahan does appear to go a step beyond Mills in allowing the recovery of
attorneys' fees from an adverse party where there is no fund in effect or
otherwise. It is important to remember, however, that the wrongful conduct
61. 424 F.2d at 168.
62. 288 F. Supp. 836 (D. Va. 1968).
63. Churning involves excess trading in a client's account by his broker. Id.
at 847.
64. Id. at 849.
65. A. BROMBERG, SEcuarrizs LAw-FRuD-SEC RULE lOb-5, 255, § 11.6 (1967).
66. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
67. The SEC as amicus in Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970)
argued that "the proper test for whether misrepresentations and omissions of ma-
aterial facts are in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, thus giving
rise to a cause of action under Rule lOb-5, is whether they have influenced an
investor's judgment to buy, sell or hold such a security." Id. at 879.
68. If the take-over had been completed before plaintiff brought his cause of
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involved in Kahan prevented the creation of a fund over which the court
would have had control and from which the court could have granted
attorneys' fees to the plaintiff. By doing so, the court could have distributed
the costs equally among the members of his class. In view of the language
in Mills showing disfavor at awarding attorneys' fees from the losing party,
it is doubtful that the courts will go too far in finding exceptional "con-
duct" which warrants the awarding of attorneys' fees. At the very least,
however, Kahan serves as a powerful notice to defendants in a Rule 10b-5
action that if plaintiff says he has a class action, it should be treated as such
for settlement purposes until there is an in-court determination to the
contrary.6 9
RANDALL C. WERNTZ
69. Had a proper settlement been made in the case, the members of plaintiff's
class would have been required to share the cost of attorneys' fees.
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